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Foreword  
As humanitarian organisations, we are bound to the principle of impartiality. This means 
that our actions must be carried out on the basis of need alone. They must be focused 
on the neediest, regardless of their ethnicity or political or religious beliefs. In theory, 
this is clear and logical – but humanitarian workers experience on a daily basis how 
difficult it is to apply this principle in reality. Because in practice, other factors play a role 
in humanitarian work: Conflicting parties hinder or prevent access to the most 
vulnerable people, as has happened in Syria and Myanmar. Humanitarian workers are 
themselves attacked, as in Yemen or South Sudan. Or humanitarian assistance is 
exploited for security or migration policy interests – as we can currently see in some 
European countries. 
This collection of texts examines how the core humanitarian principle of impartiality is 
dealt with in theory and in practice, and each author develops the theme in a different 
way. The essays seek to build a bridge between research and practice on the one hand, 
and between the international discussion and the debate in Germany on the other. We 
are very pleased to have the opportunity to undertake this attempt together and we 
have found the collaborative work on this project to be an enriching experience. We 
would like to express our deep gratitude to the authors who have worked with us on 
building these bridges.  In particular we want to thank our colleagues who are working 
with humanitarian organisations, who have given their time and expertise. 
The articles are not intended to conclude the discussion, but rather to stimulate a more 
intensive debate. They will no doubt raise many questions that will require more in-
depth investigation. It is our view that we should analyse and discuss such questions 
more thoroughly and systematically in Germany. Together with other organisations and 
actors in the field of humanitarian action, we would like to encourage such analyses and 
debates. As German organisations, we need a closer involvement with academic 
research and stronger connections to international debates. At the same time, we aim 
to deepen the interaction between humanitarian practice and academic discourse. We 
hope that this collection of essays will inspire you to join us in developing and 
consolidating the critical discussion of humanitarian action.  
 
 
Cornelia Füllkrug-Weitzel              Dr. Oliver Müller                     Florian Westphal 
President                                          International Director            Managng Director  
Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe          Caritas Germany                      Doctors without Borders/ 
                                                                                                               Médecins sans Frontières 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Impartiality in discussion 
  Martin Quack 
Why is impartiality important? 
What lies at the heart of humanitarian action? And what are the biggest 
challenges it faces? Both these fundamental questions lead us to the principle 
of impartiality: 
Humanitarian action should help people solely on the basis of their needs. It 
must never discriminate according to other criteria such as gender, religion, 
ethnic background or political orientation. In this regard it differs fundamentally 
from other types of support which are ex- plicitly given according to other 
criteria: Development cooperation, for example, pursues specific interests 
relating to issues like human rights, economic relations, or combating the causes 
of displacement. It is guided by political interests and not solely by human need. 
Humanitarian action is quite distinct from this: The principle of impartiality is its 
decisive characteristic. 
Experts from aid organisations, academic research, governments, and the 
United Nations (UN) are currently discussing the various challenges faced by 
humanitar- ian assistance: The increased role of local and national actors in 
crisis-hit regions, digitisation and its associated innovations, the expansion of 
hitherto western- influenced humanitarian systems on other actors or the 
linkage of relief and development and the UN’s Agenda 2030 Sustainable 
Development Goals. In such discussions, one of the biggest challenges 
confronting the humanitarian community is partly being overlooked: Aid 
workers are simply unable to actually reach the people in many crisis zones, 
although their needs are immense. In practice, the provision of humanitarian 
assistance is dependent on factors such as financing, the security situation for 
aid workers, and on whether local rulers or governments allow aid in. This means 
that the principle of impartiality does not only have a special status – it is also 
extremely difficult to realise in practice. 
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The humanitarian principles 
Humanitarian action is necessary when people who are affected by natural disasters, 
epidemics, war and displacement are unable to cope with the emergency situation on their 
own, or when their governments are unwilling or unable to adequately cover their needs. 
Humanitarian assistance is to be allocated in accordance with the humanitarian principles:1 
The principle of 
humanity 
The principle of humanity states that humanitarian action should above 
all else save lives and relieve human suffering. Solidarity with the affected 
people is expressed in the humanitarian imperative to provide 
humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. 
The principle of 
impartiality 
The principle of impartiality is derived directly from this: Since all people 
have the same dignity and the same rights, and humanitarian relief is 
provided according to human need, every individual must be given 
assistance according to their needs – irrespective of their social or 
religious group. This not only applies in a humanitarian crisis between 
different groups of people, but also on a global scale. Impartiality is a 
factor that clearly distinguishes humanitarian action from other forms of 
support, as well as from international collaboration in which impartiality 
is not a prerequisite.  
The principle of 
independence 
Whereas the first two principles are considered ethical values in 
themselves, the principle of independence is generally viewed as a 
necessary tool to ensure that assistance can be provided solely based on 
need. It asserts that humanitarian action must be independent from other 
interests such as national security or financial interests. 
The principle of 
neutrality 
The principle of neutrality states that humanitarian action must not give 
preference to any conflicting party. It does not possess an ethical value 
itself, but is also considered a tool: Upholding neutrality is often essential 
to gain the respect of all parties in a conflict. Only then do humanitarian 
actors have a chance of reaching the people who most urgently need help. 
The humanitarian principles were drawn up by the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement. They were included in UN General Assembly resolutions in 1991 and 
1994.2 Governments3 and non- governmental organisations4 have repeatedly made a 
commitment to them. Moreover, access to people in need is a matter of human rights: 
According to the Geneva Convention, conflicting parties must allow relief to be provided if 
it is necessary and impartial.5 
 5 
 
Broadening the discussion 
Due to the difficulty of realising impartiality in practice, it is important that we 
analyse both the political context of humanitarian action and the practical 
experiences of humanitarian workers in specific contexts and then discuss the 
consequences. This is what this collection of texts aims to do: It deliberately 
brings together authors from academic research and from humanitarian 
practice, creating a link between debates in Germany and the broader 
international discussion.  
In order to deepen the debate on impartiality, the authors examine some of the 
fundamental questions involved on various levels: What is the current status of 
the humanitarian system and how does this affect the principle of impartiality? 
Do so-called ‘forgotten crises’ call impartiality into question? And what does the 
process of localisation in humanitarian action mean for impartiality? 
Is the humanitarian system broke or broken? This was a question that was raised 
in the run-up to the first World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2016. The fact 
is, although the available funds have increased significantly, humanitarian actors 
are unable to meet the worldwide need for assistance. Moreover, assistance is 
often not provided impartially. But in what way exactly does the current political 
context impede humanitarian action? Does it exacerbate the crises around the 
world that force people into hardship? And what might humanitarian action look 
like in the future? Antonio Donini poses these fundamental questions in the first 
essay. He analyses what he describes as the “crisis” of humanitarianism (p. 26), 
and raises questions on where this crisis might lead. Will western governments 
and organisations lose influence in the wake of “decolonising humanitarianism” 
(p. 21) and the decreasing importance of multilateral institutions? Will other 
centres of humanitarian thought and action flourish instead, perhaps bringing 
new “mobilising myths” to the fore (p. 25)? And will humanitarian organisations 
be compelled to find new, public and civic funding sources for their work? Donini 
asserts that fundamental change is required because the current system does 
not “serve us well in the new and violent international and political landscape 
we face” (p. 26). 
However, the people on the ground – both the affected populations and relief 
workers – cannot afford to wait for the necessary changes, assert Julia Steets 
and Katherine Haver in response to Donini. They claim that despite all the 
fundamental problems, humanitarian workers have to find a way to deal with 
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the specific practical challenges on the ground every single day. This is the only 
way they can provide assistance. So what role do the humanitarian principles 
play in this, especially the principle of impartiality? How can the principles be 
implemented, even in particularly difficult contexts? The authors make concrete 
proposals for this and shine a spotlight on the small number of organisations 
that are already providing relief in extremely dangerous contexts. In closing, 
they raise another important question: Can German non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) deliver significant added value at all in such contexts? 
The principle of impartiality does not only apply within a specific humanitarian 
crisis – it also means there has to be equality of assistance among different crises 
around the world. In other words, people should receive relief solely on the basis 
of their need, wherever this is necessary – be it after a natural disaster or in a 
war, in distant countries or on the borders of Europe. In reality, however, many 
crises are forgotten or neglected – financially, politically, and in the media. What 
significance does the principle of impartiality have in these crises? Is it true that 
some crises are ‘forgotten’ because the donor countries lack the political 
interest to finance humanitarian action? If so, it would mean that in such cases 
strategic interests determine the provision of assistance rather than people’s 
needs.  
One of the few recent and empirical examinations of how funds are granted for 
forgotten crises was written by Neil Narang. His analysis is presented in Martin  
Quack’s essay. Quack describes how Narang uses statistical methods to examine 
the influence of various factors on the amount of humanitarian assistance 
provided in civil war regions, both during a war and afterwards. According to 
Narang’s analysis, humanitarian assistance basically adheres to the 
humanitarian principles as long as civil wars are ongoing – in other words, 
assistance in such cases is largely dictated by humani- tarian factors. However, 
after wars have ended, political interests assume more importance as regards 
the allocation of funds. Narang’s conclusion is important and it raises further 
questions: Can this difference between wartime and postwar periods be linked 
to a sharp drop in international attention when a war is over? And if so, what is 
the nature of this link? 
In her essay, Sabrina Khan examines the reasons why crises are forgotten. She 
presents various factors and illustrates them based on the practical experience 
of Islamic Relief in Yemen and Myanmar. In both of these countries, relief 
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organisations sometimes have no access to the people in greatest need – even 
though they act with neutrality, impartiality and transparency. However, 
“forgotten crises should not just be left to NGOs”, says Khan (p. 54). Instead it is 
the “duty and responsibility of states and the whole international humanitarian 
community” to give them adequate attention (ibid.). 
During the WHS, the notion of strengthening the role of local actors gained 
momentum – the so-called ‘localisation’ of practical relief and the humanitarian 
system. In concrete terms it was decided, as part of the Grand Bargain, that 
much more money should be transferred directly to local actors in future. But 
what exactly is a ‘local actor’? Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop explores this in his 
essay – while raising the objection that the question should not be given priority 
over the question of how relief can be as humanitarian as possible. He examines 
the effect of localisation on impartiality and argues that local and international 
organisations need to work together and to learn from each other if they want 
to implement the humanitarian principles. 
Inez Kipfer-Didavi counters that local actors are quite able to implement the 
humanitarian principles – as long as the institutional and financial conditions are 
right. She sketches out a comprehensive localisation approach that incorporates 
the informal local level and allows affected people to play a role in the planning 
and provision of their relief. Such an approach goes much further than direct 
financial support for NGOs and requires “a strengthening of community 
engagement competences among international and local actors” (p. 80). 
Inspiring further debate 
This collection of essays reaffirms that there is still a lot of work to be done in achieving 
humanitarian action that is designed by affected people and their organisations. The 
essays compiled in this collection have mainly been written by representatives of 
international organisations from the global north. However, the authors reflect on this 
problem and put their conclusions up for debate. It is our hope that this collection makes 
a substantial contribution on the path to achieving greater diversity and exchange of 
ideas in humanitarian action. 
Translated from German by  Alexander Zuckrow 
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Endnotes 
 1) On the humanitarian principles, see also 
https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/OOM- humanitarianprinciples 
_eng_28Feb2017_0.pdf [09.03.2018]. 
 2) Ibid. 
 3) See, for example, the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, 
www.ghdinitiative.org [09.03.2018], and the European Commission, 2008: The 
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. 
 4) See, for example, the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster 
Relief, 31.12.1994, Publication Ref. 1067. Available at: 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-0021067.pdf [09.03.2018]. 
 5) See Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the 
Additional  Protocols of 1977. 
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2. The end of impartiality?  
2.1 The future of humanitarian action: Reflections on impartiality 
Antonio Donini 
Humanitarianism is in crisis – but what are the current challenges? And in what ways 
could the humanitarian system change in future? Will western actors gradually lose 
control, to be replaced by other centres of humanitarian thought and action? And do 
relief organisations need to find new ways of financing their activities? The author is 
convinced that only a complete transformation of the system can help to end the 
suffering of civilians in an increasingly complex, insecure and violent world. 
Predictions are always difficult, especially about the future. That’s what US baseball 
player Yogi Berra used to say. Nevertheless, in this essay I will focus on the evolving 
context in which humanitarian action takes place and the space it occupies between the 
hard rock of politics and the vagaries of pragmatism. I will spare the reader an analysis 
of what is wrong inside the humanitarian machine – the nitty-gritty of coordination, the 
daily slog through clusters and log-frames and the more or less futile attempts at reform.  
I come from Italy, where people are skilled in a very peculiar science called ‘dietrologia’, 
or ‘behindology’. The topic of this essay, then, is the ‘behindology’ of humanitarianism. 
It will attempt to unscramble the functions that humanitarianism performs in twenty-
first century international relations, and the codes that underpin it.  
‘Humanitarianism’ has always been an ambiguous concept  
The concept of humanitarianism is fraught with ambiguities. It connotes several 
separate but overlapping realities: an ideology, a movement and a profession. Together, 
they form a political economy. But humanitarianism is also an establishment, a complex 
system that operates on power relationships, and an ecosystem, in which different 
species of humanitarians compete and co-exist. What unites the various facets of 
humanitarianism is a broad commitment to alleviating suffering and protecting the lives 
of civilians caught up in armed conflicts or other disasters. Despite this common goal, 
however, the ideology, the movement, the profession and the establishment are deeply 
fractured.  
Like other ‘isms’ – communism and catholicism come to mind – humanitarianism 
propounds lofty aims that serve to hide deep contradictions, conflicting alignments and 
power plays, manipulation and instrumentalisation, personality cults, struggles over 
resources and market share and, sometimes, shady financial transactions. It includes 
defenders of the orthodox high church, heretics, fellow travellers, revisionists and 
extremist fringes. And nowadays there are also for-profit and military wings. 
Organised humanitarianism – the international, national and local institutions that 
provide assistance in times of crisis – commands huge resources: up to US$27 billion in 
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2016.1 The humanitarian system can decide where to use this money or not. Organised 
humanitarianism also constitutes an important form of govern- ance. Not in the sense 
that there is a single force or source of power that directs its work. Rather than 
principles or overarching strategies, what keeps the system (somewhat) together is its 
network power. 
This power is concentrated around an oligopoly of a small group of donors, UN agencies 
and NGOs. These actors set the rules of the humanitarian club. Organised 
humanitarianism is ‘of the west’ in the sense that western donors, and the organisations 
they support, call most of the shots. The west does not own and operate humanitarian 
governance, it maintains a controlling influence over it – much like it does for global 
security and economic governance.  
Existential malaise permeates the humanitarian system 
This de facto control over discourse and action has always been problematic, but now it 
seems to have hit a stumbling block. An existential malaise is permeating the 
humanitarian ‘system’. Growth and institutionalisation have affected the way it 
functions. The increase in professionalism and bureaucracy is not new, but the very 
weight of organisational complexity affects the speed and effectiveness of response.2  
Like many systems, organised humanitarianism suffers from the classic transition of 
institutions from means to an end to ends in themselves. As humanitarian scholar Hugo 
Slim acutely notes: 
“The Weberian struggle between charisma and bureaucracy is alive and well in 
humanitarian organisational culture today, and the dominance of bureaucracy is felt by 
many to have a negative effect on the type, tempo, daring and success of operations.”3 
How impartiality suffers in the current system 
However, it is the external causes of the malaise that are of most concern. The task of 
saving and protecting lives, and of doing so impartially and independently, is affected, 
as perhaps never before since the end of the second world war, by the inability of the 
so-called international community to address armed conflict in any meaningful way. 
Where they are not blocked, humanitarian interventions follow the dictates of 
Realpolitik. If you follow the money, it is easy to see that salve is applied selectively.4 
Current funding mechanisms do not ensure that humanitarian action is provided in a 
truly impartial manner, that is, according to need not only within crises but also across 
crises. Vulnerable and atrisk people in forgotten or ignored crises suffer because of 
funding gaps triggered by the political preferences of particular international donors 
(see the articles on forgotten crises from p. 26). 
But the challenges to humanitarian principles, and to impartiality in particular, run much 
deeper and start at the top, as this statement suggests: 
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“Aleppo is to Syria today what Guernica was to Spain during its civil war, a martyred city 
and the harbinger of more disasters to come. Equally, the United Nations (UN) risks 
becoming, in the 21st century, what the League of Nations became in the 20th: 
irrelevant.”5  
This is not written by a rabble-rousing NGO activist or rebel academic. It comes from one 
of the permanent members of the UN Security Council – the permanent representative 
of France. 
From Afghanistan to Ukraine, from Libya to Yemen, from South Sudan to Syria, the UN 
Security Council is blocked. And there is no respite in sight for civilians. Many crisis 
settings are now ‘Inter- national Humanitarian Law (IHL)-free war zones’. Indeed, IHL is 
ignored and humanitarian principles are jettisoned – whether by state, or non-state, 
armed groups. Slaughter, torture, and ‘surrender or starve’ strategies thrive, despite 
much hand-wringing.  
Those who manage to flee war zones do not fare much better. Well before US President 
Trump’s election, Europe, the cradle of western enlightenment and humanitarianism, 
had become a flag-bearer for an untrammelled rollback of rights. Many states parties to 
the 1951 refugee convention have abandoned their legal responsibilities. Instead, they 
have invested in deterrence measures to block entry to those seeking refuge from the 
terror of war zones or tyrannical regimes. The European Union is externalising its 
borders and pursuing short-sighted and aggressive return policies, undermining the 
prospects of asylum seekers stuck in Turkey or Libya. It is making aid to the Sahel and 
Afghanistan conditional on pushbacks or migrant suppression. Meanwhile, the global 
south, including some of its poorest countries, continues to host 84% of the global 
refugee population.6  
Multiple perceptions of humanitarianism 
Moreover, there isn’t just one humanitarianism, there are several. The northern/ 
western humanitarian movement, rooted in various traditions of charity and 
philanthropy and in the civilising impulses of the Enlightenment, constitutes the 
dominant, multi-billion dollar, visible face of organised humanitarianism. But there are 
other traditions as well. Some are ancient and have only recently been noticed by 
mainstream humanitarians. Others are emerging and their members are increasingly 
vocal. They are challenging the pillars of certitude of the northern humanitarian canon. 
For the non-blinkered humanitarian, a wealth of studies are available that document 
these different traditions, including, for instance, Saudi or Turkish ones.7 
The point is that humanitarian action and humanitarianism – the practice and the 
ideology – look very different depending on where you are. This was brought home to 
me in a recent discussion with an Indian academic who explained that she was trying to 
get the Indian government interested in supporting some research work on 
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humanitarian issues. She found it very difficult to meet anyone senior in the Indian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When she finally met a senior official, he told her “we don’t 
even use the term... For us, humanitarianism is colonialism”. 
Decolonising humanitarianism? 
This is one of the challenges for the future. It is about the inherent coloniality of a 
humanitarian discourse intrinsically linked to the western rhetoric of modernity – a 
rhetoric of compassion and salvation (yesterday) and development and containment 
(today) – that has spread from the European centre to the farthest borderlands of the 
periphery. This western ‘epistemic code’ is the software on which organised 
humanitarianism runs.8 
The argument goes like this: Humanitarianism is about our relationship with distant 
others. We don’t usually use the term for social protection issues or disaster response 
‘over here’ in ‘our’ countries. We use it for things that happen ‘over there’. Coloniality 
theory (Mignolo, Escobar, Duffield, among others) has taught us that the emergence of 
the dominant humani- tarian system has much to do with the way in which the west 
looks at the world and shapes it. Humanitarian discourse and machinery have grown 
with the expansion of capitalism, the liberal order and the more or less hegemonic 
power relations that came with it. Humanitarian action is part and parcel of this ‘western 
code’ of knowledge and power.  
Of course, there were other, or different, or buried under, western humanitarian 
traditions of protecting and caring for discourse. That these traditions are now re-
emerging is interesting in itself. 
Changes in the international system affect the ability to address humanitarian needs 
Regardless of whether we think that decolonising humanitarianism would be a good 
thing, or that such a thing would be possible, there are changes happening as we speak 
that will have serious implications for the future of organised humanitarian action. 
These changes include the crisis of the multilateral system that emerged from the 
second world war and its ability to address humanitarian need. Organised humanitarian 
action as we know it is heading for very choppy seas. 
I will offer the following thoughts:  
• If the west is in retreat and the locus of economic, political, cultural and soft power is 
leaning eastwards, we can assume that this will have a significant impact on 
humanitarian discourse and action. Hard and soft power tend to go hand in hand. It is 
not inconceivable that China, and, later perhaps, India, building on the strength of their 
economy, will use the range of tools in the humanitarian handbook including their soft 
power to extend their influence to new areas, as the west has done in the past. What 
this does for the respect of impartiality and humanitarian principles more generally is 
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another matter. Perhaps ‘our’ aid was not seen as so impartial at the receiving end. 
The cold metal of the water pipe that brings clean water to a village may well be a 
manifestation of ‘our’ technical expertise and generosity, but it may be redolent of 
colonialism and exploitation for ‘them’.“  
• Because the political economy of the dominant humanitarian system is a function of 
the way in which the ‘oli- gopoly’ raises, moves and controls funds, people and other 
essential resources, it is safe to assume that current and future tectonic shifts will 
increasingly challenge the current business model of the humanitarian enterprise.  
• The present love affair between western donors and aid agencies may not endure. 
Especially if there were to be a sharp reduction in funding – because of President 
Trump, Brexit, financial crisis or simply because domestic priorities absorb a greater 
portion of tax revenue – this could lead to ‘market failures’ in how the mainly western 
oligopoly addresses crisis settings. Other players and stakeholders (private, diaspora, 
non-western, statist, non-principle-based, etc.) might then present increasing 
challenges to traditional humanitarian principles and their purported ‘universalism’. 
This will have a direct impact on the technology and coordination structures of the 
dominant system. An increasing number of new or ‘recently noticed’ actors are 
bypassing these structures anyway. Turkey and China, for example, do not engage with 
UN humanitarian coordination structures. Even many western NGOs find these 
structures burdensome and tend to work around them whenever they can. And 
national NGOs have little access to them anyway. 
Also, based on the above thoughts, a few hypotheses on where we might be heading: 
Multilateralism appears to be in retreat and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable 
future. The crisis of multilateralism runs deeper than just Trump and Brexit. The three 
major international gatherings on humanitarian issues in 2015 and 2016 – the 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, the World Humanitarian 
Summit (WHS), and the New York Refugee and Migration Summit – produced no 
tangible results. Worse, they were symptomatic of an inter- national community that 
has lost its capacity to negotiate on common problems.  
In the aftermath of the second world war, international organisations were set up to 
address collective problems, and they thrived. But this push towards international norm-
setting and international cooperation seems to have become a spent force. This will 
have significant impact on humanitarian action (including on funding and access). It can 
create challenges to humanitarian principles and result in even less emphasis on 
protection. It will also affect the ability of the so-called international community to 
address factors that drive crises, such as climate change and a faltering international 
peace and security apparatus. There is a lot of rhetoric around the importance of 
preventing crises. The current UN Secretary General and others point to the need for 
coherent or integrated approaches to crises, bringing humanitarian, development and 
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peace/ security instruments closer together. But the reality is that the international 
‘system’ – from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, not to mention Syria and Yemen – is in a state 
close to cardiac arrest. 
The void left by the partial retreat of the US into isolationism, combined with the global 
war on terror, a new coldish war with Russia and a potentially very hot new war in the 
Middle East, will only deepen the humanitarian malaise and the ability of the system to 
retain a modicum of impartiality and independence. A multipolar world, or one that 
relies on ‘minilateralism’ – ad hoc coalitions of the like-minded – may not be very 
sympathetic to humanitarian values and will pose new challenges to humanitarian 
actors worldwide. This is particularly the case with western-led humanitarianism, which 
will increasingly find itself outside of what was its domineering comfort zone to date. 
The functions that ‘humanitarian’ action performs in the international sphere will 
change, perhaps dramatically. Humanitarian action’s multiple functions have included 
acting as a conveyor belt for western values, lifestyles, and the promotion of liberal 
agendas, while making countries safe for capital. If the west is now in retreat, other 
centres of humani- tarian discourse and practice are likely to blossom. If so, this will be 
a major reversal for humanitarianism as we know it.  
For decades, humanitarian action represented the smiling face of globalisation. It was 
one of the west’s ways of opening up to the rest of the world. Now, it is much more about 
closure, containment, and shutting the door. It is about keeping the bulk of refugees and 
migrants away from the ring-fenced citadels of the west.  
Humanitarian business models and funding might change  
If western governments lose (some) control over the system, this could create an 
expanding role for other forms of global civil society or private action, financing and 
response that might still be largely based in rich countries, but potentially different in 
nature. The current business model of the humanitarian enterprise – with the exception 
of Doctors without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and a few other NGOs and 
some faith-based organisations which are privately funded – relies heavily on the donor-
UN-implementing agency triad. The fact that many international NGOs (INGOs) rely 
heavily (up to 70% in the case of some large US-based organisations) on government 
funds provided by the taxpayer creates huge vulnerabilities for such agencies if the 
political or economic climate or the tax base suffers rapid changes.  
An expansion of the MSF model, which is citizen-funded rather than state-funded, would 
not necessarily be a bad thing. An INGO that relies almost exclusively on state funds is 
not really a civil society organisation. It is self-referential and, other than upward 
accountability on how it uses state funds, it has no ‘members’ that can hold it to account 
for its policies and actions.  
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Citizen-funded organisations like MSF are akin to movements where there is room for 
internal debate and, at least in theory, the constituency can overrule the leaders. Many 
other humanitarian agencies could be forced to find innovative approaches to raise 
funds to support their activities, should their state or institutional funds (e.g. EU funds) 
be curtailed. For example, they could, for better or worse, raise funds from private 
capital or a ‘Tobin tax’ on airline tickets or capital flows.  
An important longer-term threat to the system as it is the fact that, in a global 
economy, (western) government tax receipts derived to a great extent from the 
taxation of workers within the domestic economy, may not generate sufficient 
funds. These will not be enough to cover escalating welfare needs, both domestic 
(health, welfare and social care) and global, including humanitarian response. 
Increased robotisation and ‘Uberisation’ of western economies might lead to 
massive unemployment levels that could severely cut funds available for overseas 
assistance. We are already seeing massive shifts of funds from the international to 
the domestic ledger: From Austria to Turkey, ‘humanitarian’ Official Development 
Assistance funds are being used for the care and maintenance of migrants and 
asylum seekers within domestic borders.9 Or perhaps funds might go to climate 
change mitigation rather than to humanitarian causes.  
Finally, (western) humanitarianism may well have reached its historical limits and 
could now be on the cusp of retreat. The transition from the romantic phase of 
humanitarianism to the technological, institutional, and governance one, is now 
complete. In other words, the energy that made humanitarianism a means to 
accomplish valuable ethical ends is waning. The propulsive force of the humanitarian 
“mobilising myth”,10 which provided meaning and energy to all those involved in the 
humanitarian endeavour, may sputter. This ‘myth’ provided a generation of aid 
workers, individually and collectively, with answers to questions about their place 
and social functions in the international arena. This is now under question and may 
be replaced by other mobilising myths (non-western, sovereignty-based, 
transformational, solidarity-based, or overtly politicised) or simply fade from the 
global scene – as has been the case for earlier mobilising myths (revolution, 
decolonisation, modernisation and the like). 
Reflection and reform are needed  
Caught between the pessimism of reason and the flagging optimism of will, what is 
the reflective humanitarian to do? 
Perhaps the first thing is to stand back from the current crisis, the confusing background 
noise, the day to day struggle of innocent people caught up in un- imaginable violence, 
and ask: How did we get here? What are the forces for change and how do we engage 
with them? Organised humanitarianism is stuck in the eternal present and is poorly 
equipped to adapt to a more complex, insecure, and threatening world.  
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A more narrowly focused, back to basics humanitarian enterprise would not necessarily 
be a bad thing. It might be narrower in scope, independent, informed solely by the views 
and needs of the crisis-affected, and focused on saving and protecting lives in the here 
and now. It would perhaps be the best way of nurturing the values and ethos of an 
enterprise that may be battered, bruised, and often abused, but is still often the only 
available safety net for people in extremis.  
For now, the political and sociological obstacles to such a shift remain high. It would be 
necessary to buck the current trend of putting even more things in the humanitarian 
basket or explicitly incorporating humanitarian action into development or peace and 
security endeavours, and start protecting this basket from excessive 
instrumentalisation. The odds are not favourable. For now, the mantra in western 
capitals and even at the UN is for more integration of humanitarian, human rights, 
development and peace/security agendas, not less. There is still a long way to go before 
the lessons of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen are learned and acted upon. 
Meanwhile, civilians continue to die and suffer, and the inhumanity of war seems to 
have no limits. 
It is time for organised humanitarianism to acknowledge that it is in crisis, and to come 
to grips with a possible reform agenda. Ideas for change are already on the table. Many 
were submitted with the WHS in mind. There was an expectation in the aid community 
that the summit would provide an opportunity to discuss transformational change. 
These expectations were sorely dashed; no new political consensus was negotiated. In 
fact, the opposite happened. And the change agreed upon – such as the so-called Grand 
Bargain, a set of technical measures aimed to inject more transparency and 
accountability in how donor funds are allocated and managed – was already ‘in the air’ 
and agreed upon before the summit. Even the technical has now become political, with 
the Grand Bargain implementation moving at the speed of tectonic plates.11  
History tells us that transformational change in the international system only happens 
in the aftermath of a major shock. Will the combination of the crisis of multilateralism, 
climate change, on-going vicious wars, and massive displacement provide such an 
impetus? The future is unclear, and many variables are at play. Can the system be 
patched up and made fit for purpose by injecting more diversity and democracy in the 
way it is run? Or has the universality train left the station for good? Is the best we can 
hope for a smaller, more focused western humanitarian system surrounded by an array 
of different approaches to saving and protecting lives? Perhaps a ‘multiversal’, loosely 
connected (eco) system?  
What is certain is that the current humanitarian system – broke or broken or both – 
won’t serve us well in the new and violent international and political landscape we face.  
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2.2. Dealing with challenges to decisions based on the humanitarian 
principles1 
Julia Steets and Katherine Haver 
Providing aid impartially poses major challenges for aid agencies, but there are specific 
ways to address these. For example, humanitarian actors can openly discuss 
compromises and adopt ethical risk management. These and other approaches have 
proven to be effective in organisations that are able to work in very insecure contexts. 
Can German NGOs bring any significant added value to such contexts by providing aid 
themselves? Or would it be more efficient and effective for them to support other 
organisations? 
In his essay in this publication, Antonio Donini powerfully describes the malaise of the 
current humanitarian system, which is overly bureaucratic, northern, and politicised. 
Donini makes suggestions on how the “reflective humanitarian” (p. 15) can adjust his 
thinking and calls for a general transformation of the system.  
Our approach is different. We look at the situation from the bottom up, starting with 
the old-fashioned, dirty-booted humanitarian trying to deliver assistance in often very 
challenging contexts. We agree that the humanitarian system faces fundamental 
problems. But it continues chugging on fairly undeterred for the time being. That means 
it is worthwhile to look at the specific challenges humani- tarians seeking to deliver 
assistance in a principled way are experiencing in the field. This essay will attempt to do 
this and will discuss how humanitarians can deal better with these challenges. 
Ethical dilemmas are inevitable  
Our ‘old-fashioned humanitarian’ tries to deliver assistance as best she can. To her, 
adhering to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence is a 
question of morality and ethics – of doing the right thing in the right way. It is also a 
matter of identity as a humani- tarian. Last, but not least, it is a practical consideration 
as it is the most proven way to protect the people she seeks to assist as well as herself.  
Humanitarian workers often treat the principles like a mantra, as absolutes that must 
be ‘complied’ with under all circumstances. Yet, in practice, it is not a matter of 
complying with the principles, but of applying them to specific situations. Ethical 
dilemmas inevitably arise when working in areas that experience armed conflict, attacks 
on aid workers, and a multitude of restrictions on the delivery of aid.  
Acting in a principled way, therefore, does not mean always avoiding compromises or 
concessions. Rather, it means being aware of the options available and deciding 
consciously whether to make compromises and which kind, bearing in mind that these 
decisions can also have important long-term implications. 
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There are many practical challenges to impartiality 
As an example, let’s consider impartiality as the most central of the principles that helps 
translate humanity into practice. Impartiality means that humanitarian assistance and 
services should be offered on the basis of need alone. There are many reasons why this 
can be difficult to achieve.  
The global allocation of funds, for example, is often influenced by political 
considerations (see the articles on forgotten crises from page 26). In-country, aid 
organisations and their staff may have their own biases, favouring certain clans, gender 
or ethnic groups, or family members. In addition, governments, armed actors, or local 
communities may pressure or threaten aid agencies to deliver assist- ance in their area 
or avoid other areas.  
Countering this is difficult when aid agencies lack information and do not know how 
many people are in need or how severe their needs are. It’s also difficult when the idea 
of targeting aid at the most vulnerable is in conflict with local norms and existing 
community support mechanisms.  
In practice, it is not a matter of complying with the principles, but of applying them to 
specific situations. 
Aid agencies can deal with these challenges to impartiality in different ways 
Those who want to reach those most in need – and there is only a small number of 
humanitarian organisations that are willing to work in the highest risk locations to do 
this2 – can do a few immediate things to deal with these challenges.  
One approach is to make small, carefully considered compromises to gain access. Aid 
organisations can, for example, offer some limited activities to benefit less vulnerable 
groups if that allows them to deliver assistance and offer services to those most in need. 
Offering aid simultaneously to communities in conflict with each other can also be a 
solution.  
Doing so, humanitarians should always recognise explicitly that they are making 
compromises and encourage staff, especially local staff or partners, to openly discuss 
trade-offs and their consequences. The current practice is to portray the principles as 
inviolable. This makes staff and partners afraid to raise possible compromises with their 
managers and take important decisions without consulting them.  
Another measure is to be more aware of the potential biases of staff members and 
partners by analysing them. This helps organisations to better anticipate and address 
problems that can stem from the identity or political or religious orientation of staff 
members and partners. It can also be important to avoid over-reliance on hyper-local 
staff or partners, i.e. staff and partners drawn from the very communities the 
organisation is trying to help, as this can increase the risk of favouritism and bias. 
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Finally, humanitarian organisations should contribute to a realistic picture of how many 
of those in need they reach. Due to some of the institutional dynamics that Antonio 
Donini mentions in his essay in this publication, humanitarian organisations often 
exaggerate their presence and capacity to deliver to attract more funding from donors 
and the general public.3 This, however, leaves communities who would need it without 
support. The humanitarian system, therefore, needs more robust reporting systems to 
track who actually delivers what where, and organisations need to contribute to these 
systems frequently and transparently.  
To generally get better at applying humanitarian principles, agencies should adopt 
ethical risk managemen 
More generally, humanitarian organisations need risk management approaches that 
consider ethical risks if they want to deal better with challenges to humanitarian 
principles. There is a trend, at least among larger humanitarian organisations, to adopt 
formal risk management systems. Based on global risk registers, these organisations 
analyse and prioritise risks. On this basis, they address and mitigate the most important 
risks. Field staff tend to appreciate the approach as it allows for a systematic and 
complete analysis, weighing up the likelihood and potential impact of a threat.4 
However, most current risk management approaches have two important 
shortcomings:  
1. They often do not include ethical risks or ethical risks are subsumed under many 
other operational or reputa- tional risks.  
2. They do not, in most cases, formally weigh up risks against the expected benefits 
of an action or operation.  
Risk mitigation systems should, therefore, not only formally consider ethical risks, but 
help decide how much risk organisations are willing to accept depending on how critical 
an intervention is. This helps organisations decide how much residual risk they are 
willing to accept in different situations.  
Organisations working in the most difficult contexts share a set of other good practices 
A relatively small but diverse group of organisations has better access to people in need 
in particularly difficult areas.5 These organisations have certain approaches and 
practices in common.6 They:  
• have a strong organisational culture that prioritises meeting the most acute 
humanitarian needs, however difficult that may be;  
• try to involve people affected by decisions in the decision making process and 
invest in understanding the local context;  
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• accept that compromises may be ne- cessary and make space for difficult 
conversations, especially between local and international staff or their partner 
organisations;  
• allow staff on the ground to make difficult decisions, supported by managers in 
capitals and regional offices or headquarters who check in with them frequently;  
• have a good system for escalating important decisions, making sure decisions on 
risks that can have major consequences for the people they affect, or the 
organisation, involve senior management;  
• have access to some degree of independent (unearmarked or loosely earmarked) 
funding which means they have flexibility to change interventions if the context 
alters or input from affected people requires it;  
• map ways in which the political interests of donors could influence humanitarian 
assistance in specific contexts to enhance their operational independence;  
• challenge regulations and practices that impede their operations where donor 
funding imposes limitations on decision-making based on the humanitarian 
principles;  
• incorporate ethics into regular processes, such as training and staff discussions, 
performance reviews and evaluations;  
• document difficult decisions (including decisions not to act) to create an 
‘institutional memory’ and promote learning. 
The list shows that any organisation that difficult environments needs to make wants to 
be able to work in the most considerable investments.  
Implications for humanitarian practice and debate in Germany 
What does this mean for humanitarian practice and debate in Germany? The German 
humanitarian landscape has certain traits that merit special consideration in this 
context.  
The German government has a reputation for being a relatively ‘hands-off’ donor. This 
allows humanitarian organisations funded by the German government much of the 
independence and flexibility that is necessary for a principled response. To preserve this 
in the longer-term, German NGOs should go the extra mile today to demonstrate that 
they are impartial in the way they provide assistance. Tracking with precision how their 
activities correlate with levels of needs and gaps left by other responders would be a 
first, critical step in this direction.   
There is strong political pressure in Germany to use aid to tackle the root causes of 
forced migration. The lion’s share of German humanitarian funding already goes to Syria 
and its neighbours (according to the United Nations Office for the Continuation of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service, almost 50 percent was allocated 
to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq in 2017). The German government offices in charge 
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of deciding how funds are used should defend a global allocation based on need. 
German NGOs should support them in this effort. If necessary, they can do this by 
rejecting funding for crises they consider overfunded compared to other, more 
forgotten emergencies.  
German NGOs do not currently have a strong presence and operations in the most 
difficult and dangerous environments. This does not necessarily mean they should build 
up this capacity – as this would require significant investments in staff capacity, risk 
management, and financial flexibility, amongst other things. Rather, they should 
consider whether they could add significant value in these contexts, or if it would be 
more cost-efficient and effective to further invest in other organisations who already 
have a comparative advantage in working in these settings. This would require them to 
leave behind competitive institutional instincts – maybe itself a prerequisite for 
principled humanitarian action. 
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2.3.Casestudy: Doctors without Borders in Syria  
Jolina Haddad 
Doctors without Borders in Syria 
• Brutal civil war since March 2011 
• Operation of five health centres and three mobile clinics as well as partnerships 
with medical facilities in northern Syria  
• Support for medical facilities in the form of medicines, materials, advice and 
funding in areas where direct access is not possible 
• Up to now, no permission to provide relief in areas under government control 
Medical care for Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries 
 
The brutal conflict in Syria has been raging for more than seven years, and has brought 
terrible suffering on the civilian population. According to UNHCR, more than five million 
people have been forced to flee Syria since 2011, and over six million men, women and 
children have been displaced within the country.  
In many regions, the Syrian health system has completely broken down. The few 
remaining health facilities often have to operate under extremely difficult 
circumstances: There are regular power cuts and there is a lack of materials, fuels and 
clean water. Regular air attacks on medical institutions have dramatically worsened the 
situation. According to the World Health Organization, by the end of 2017 over half of 
all Syrian health facilities had been completely destroyed or were only able to operate 
on a limited basis. 
At the same time, over 13 million people are dependent on humanitarian relief – among 
them almost three million men, women and children who are trapped in areas that are 
under siege or difficult to reach. They have hardly any access to humanitarian relief or 
medical care and are often cut off from the outside world for months at a time. 
Accordingly, the needs of these people are especially urgent. 
Based purely on humanitarian need, the operation in Syria should be one of the largest 
in the history of Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). But this is 
far from being the case. Although MSF was able to implement its own projects in many 
locations when the conflict began, its teams now have no access to large areas of the 
country due to the dramatic escalation of the conflict. As a result, we have been unable 
to reach a large portion of the people who depend on humanitarian relief. 
As a humanitarian medical organisation, MSF strives to concentrate its reliefefforts on 
those people most in need – regardless of their ethnic background or political and 
religious beliefs. This is in line with the spirit of impartiality. However in Syria, MSF finds 
it almost impossible to uphold this principle given the prevailing political situation. There 
are many reasons for this: 
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Despite numerous attempts at negotiations, MSF has so far not been given permission 
by the Syrian government to operate in the areas under its control. We are also unable 
to operate in areas under the control of the so-called Islamic State due to a lack of 
security guarantees. As a consequence, MSF is currently only able to maintain a 
presence in a few parts of the country. In northern Syria we operate five health centres 
and three mobile clinics. We also have partnerships with five medical facilities. 
Since 2011, MSF has also provided support to clinics and medical networks in areas 
where we have no direct access. These programmes generally have to be coordinated 
from outside of Syria. Due to the extremely difficult security situation, MSF is unable to 
send any of its staff into these regions. Our support is therefore limited to the provision 
of medicines and materials, training and remote technical guidance, or financial 
assistance.  
Attacks on medical facilities greatly impede this form of support. Many members of staff 
were forced to flee or were killed, and in many places clinics were destroyed. In 2016 
alone, 32 medical facilities supported by MSF were targeted in 71 bombing and missile 
attacks. The consequence of this is that clinics are no longer safe places. Many patients 
avoid medical facilities because they are afraid of attacks. The services the clinics are 
able to provide under these circumstances have been reduced to a minimum. This 
means that often our help does not reach the people here who most need it. 
The example of east Aleppo vividly illustrates how difficult it can be to focus relief efforts 
on the people most in need in such circumstances: Since 2014, MSF has been providing 
regular supplies to medical facilities in the eastern part of the city. From July 2016 
onwards, this was no longer possible because the city was under siege by troops 
coordinated by the Syrian government. Despite the massive suffering the besieged 
population had to face for many months, we were unable to deliver humanitarian relief 
goods into the area. 
Ultimately we are simply not able to reach the majority of Syrian people who 
desperately need humanitarian assistance because the political interests of the 
conflicting parties are preventing our access. It is therefore impossible for MSF to 
provide needs-based relief in many areas of Syria. The example of Syria shows that 
providing impartial support in conflict zones can be extremely difficult. Political 
decisions have a direct effect on the provision of impartial humanitarian assistance and 
thus on the well-being of the affected people.  
Translated from German by Alexander Zuckrow 
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3. Forgotten crises and impartiality 
3.1. Need vs. political interests: How is aid allocated to countries 
suffering from war? 
Martin Quack 
What factors determine how much aid is provided to countries suffering from war? A 
2016 study by Neil Narang from the University of California addresses this question. 
Narang identifies key factors which indicate humanitarian need and political interest in 
civil and post-civil war states. His findings indicate that aid for countries at war is more 
humanitarian than strategic. However, his results provide some support for the claim 
that political interests play a role in the allocation of aid to post-war countries.1 
The humanitarian principles dictate that donors and agencies respond to crises in 
proportion to people’s level of need. But despite this, allocation of humanitarian 
assistance across civil war and post-civil war states shows remarkable variation that is 
not easily explained by differences in need. 
The conflicts in Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, for example, have received the 
lion’s share of international humani- tarian aid over the last two decades. Equally 
destructive conflicts in Somalia, Sierra Leone and East Timor have been relatively 
neglected by donors and aid organisations. 
How come these conflicts are ‘forgotten’? Or, rather, why is it that some emergencies 
tend to receive adequate levels of funding, while others are allocated little or no 
humanitarian assistance? 
Policymakers and aid practitioners often suggest that foreign policy interests, or indeed 
the lack of them, are the main reason for this variation. From this perspective, many 
humanitarian emergencies are either ignored or gradually neglected over time because 
they provide no compelling reasons for action beyond humanitarian need. These claims 
do not bode well for the overall humanitarian enterprise. 
Assessing how aid is allocated  
To comply with the humanitarian imperative and its associated principles of neutrality 
and impartiality, aid donors and humanitarian agencies must respond in proportion to 
need in every situation where people are suffering from a lack of life-sustaining 
resources. If, however, humanitarian aid is equally susceptible to the political priorities 
and strategic interests of donor governments, it should claim no special status in relation 
to other foreign policy tools more openly aimed at advancing the interests of donors.  
To assess how aid is allocated, some researchers have focused on explaining aggregate 
levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA). They have measured the impact of 
‘humanitarian’ versus ‘strategic’ factors on how foreign assistance is allocated. 
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However, these studies can obscure important differences across different types of 
assistance. 
Evidence that strategic interests affect the provision of development aid may not be 
particularly surprising or controversial. But a similar finding with respect to 
humanitarian aid would directly contradict the core principles of humanitarianism. 
However, there is a lack of systematic evidence to prove that foreign policy interests 
dominate humanitarian concerns when aid is allocated. 
This essay considers the significance of recipient need versus strategic interests 
specifically in humanitarian assistance to civil conflict and post-conflict states. 
Humanitarian assistance in principle and the politics of ‘forgotten’ conflicts in practice 
The idea behind humanitarian assistance is straightforward. Individuals struggling as a 
result of natural and man-made emergencies have the right to life-sustaining resources 
and protection of their basic human rights. The humanitarian principles, defined in the 
introduction to this collection of essays, aim to ensure that assistance is provided based 
on need alone, rather than political or strategic interest or cultural affinity. 
The principle of ‘impartiality’ requires that assistance is provided without regard to 
nationality, race, religion or political views. This is meant to ensure that in all crises, need 
is assessed equally. This principle is not only relevant for how aid should be distributed 
within a specific crisis, but also on the global level.  
Humanitarian practice, however, is much more complex. As Gourevitch notes:  
“The scenes of suffering that we tend to call humanitarian crises are almost always 
symptoms of political circum- stances, and there’s no apolitical way of responding to 
them — no way to act without having a political effect.”2  
Impartiality, it seems, is impossible when humanitarianism is bound to relieve warring 
parties of the burdens attached to waging war.3  
In addition, independence may be a luxury few organisations can afford in today’s 
increasingly competitive humanitarian aid industry – because donors are able to choose 
from several agencies and select ones which give them greater bargaining power and 
more control over how assistance is allocated. 
As a result, the ‘politicisation’ of humanitarian aid has become an important topic of 
debate in the last decade. Policymakers and practitioners often criticise humanitarian 
actors for disproportionately focusing resources on high-profile areas rather than where 
need is greatest. This criticism is perhaps loudest with respect to complex emergencies 
like civil wars. For instance, Vaux claims that, “after 11 September 2001, western 
security has come to dominate all other agendas, moving aid and humanitarianism even 
further towards the core of politics”.4  
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Defining ‘need’ 
There are without question vast numbers of people suffering in ‘forgotten conflicts’ 
today. Donors’ declarations of support and commitment to humanitarian principles 
mean little to them. But increasingly this has led critics to the more general presumption 
that many conflicts are neglected because they provide no compelling reason for action 
beyond need. In other words, the provision of humanitarian relief appears to be 
governed just as much, if not more, by the political priorities of donors as it is by genuine 
need. 
Indeed at first glance, the global humanitarian response to conflict-affected states often 
appears to bear little relationship to the most common indicators of global need. This 
includes the number of conflict-related deaths, income per capita, infant mortality rates, 
or the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).  
The provision of humanitarian aid is likely to be dictated by a range of factors that affect 
recipients’ need for assistance (demand-side factors) and donors’ willingness and ability 
to provide relief (supply-side factors).  
Within this complex calculus, it is possible that indicators of need have a systematic 
effect on the allocation of humanitarian aid after controlling for other factors. And 
perhaps more importantly, the same is true for indicators of strategic interests. 
Controlling for the level of need across recipients, the political priorities of donors may 
systematically affect the allocation of humanitarian aid. 
Narang’s research approach 
What distinguishes conflict areas that receive high levels of humanitarian assistance 
from those that receive little or none? To help answer this question, Narang’s research 
looked at the largest and most exhaustive set of data available on humanitarian aid 
disbursements from 1969 to 2009. The data was assembled by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and Narang used it to assess the 
relative importance of strategic and humanitarian factors in the allocation of assistance 
across conflict and post-conflict areas.  
Specifically, his analysis uses the humani- tarian aid component of ODA disbursements 
to countries and regions (DAC2a) to estimate the total amount of humanitarian aid 
disbursed each year. Within the definition of ODA, humanitarian aid is defined as: 
“assistance designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human 
dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. To be classified as humanitarian, aid 
must be consistent with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality 
and independence”.5 
Independence may be a luxury few organisations can afford in today’s increasingly 
competitive humanitarian aid industry.  
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The data includes bilateral disbursements from Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) members, disbursements from non-DAC members, and aid financed through 
multilateral institutions and NGOs. 
Measuring donor interests during and after civil war 
In theory, the objectives of ‘humanitarian aid’ are well defined across donors. However, 
in practice, there is no shared definition of ‘humanitarian need’ – despite the fact that 
assessments of need are supposed to inform decisions about where to intervene, and 
to what scale. The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) was not established until the 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182 was adopted in 1991. (The CAP is a 
tool used by humanitarian organisations to approach the donor community.) 
Furthermore, the technical guidelines for CAP did not emerge until 1999, and the 
Humani- tarian Reform process was not started until after the period under observation 
in 2005. This process was initiated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, together with 
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to improve the effectiveness of 
humanitarian response. 
Researchers Darcy and Hofmann found that formal needs assessments are often 
marginal and generally not the most important trigger for a humanitarian response. 
Their research is based on 200 interviews with key field- and headquarter-based staff in 
agencies and donor organisations. They found that there is no clear formula for how 
donors and agencies set a budget for a country or region. Requests often appear to be 
based on judgements that have little to do with need.6 
What makes the decision-making process around humanitarian aid particularly opaque 
– and unique compared to development aid – is the rapid, emergency nature of relief to 
distressed populations. Donors and humanitarian organisations operate on annual 
budgets agreed by an executive committee at the beginning of each year. But a 
substantial portion of humanitarian activities are funded on ‘flash’ or supplementary 
appeals due to unanticipated emergencies. This has important implications for how 
conflicts and conflict termination are handled in the policymaking process.  
For example, interventions in newly initiated and rapidly evolving wars are largely 
funded through supplementary appeals. The short time-frame offers limited scope for 
negotiations and requires a serious humanitarian commitment. On the other hand, post-
conflict and other “chronic situations are based on a ‘rolling’ review of programmes”.7 
They may be funded under annual budgets where there may be no formal needs 
assessment, such that a programme may be more likely to end if it is considered to be 
no longer relevant. 
The seemingly banal and bureaucratic distinction between supplementary and annual 
budgets may provide a window in which the principle of targeting need during conflict 
may give way to practical judgements at a post-conflict stage.  
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In the absence of clear decision-making guidelines, Narang analysed data to identify 
reasonable measures of both the strategic interests of donors and the humanitarian 
needs of conflict and post-conflict recipients. The aim was:  
• to estimate the strategic interests of donors and the humanitarian needs of conflict 
and post-conflict recipients separately;  
• to provide a full model of donor behaviour to assess their relative importance in 
how humanitarian aid is allocated during and after civil wars.  
Narang focused on the five most common indicators of strategic interests and 
humanitarian need in the literature. These include the following political-strategic 
interest indicators:  
• Oil exports: Has the recipient significant oil exports?8  
• Former P5 colony: Is the recipient a former colony of the P5 (the five permanent 
members) in the UN Security Council?9  
• P5 contiguity: Is the recipient located within 400 miles of one of the P5 in the UN 
Security Council?10  
• P5 affinity: How similar was the voting of the recipient with the P5 in the UN 
Security Council in the year the war started?11  
• Democracy polity average: How demo- cratic was the recipient over the five years 
before the war started.12 
In addition, Narang includes the following humanitarian need indicators:  
• Gross Domestic Product per capita, measured annually;13  
• Infant mortality rates, measured at the start of the war for countries in conflict, 
and at the end of the war for post-conflict countries;14  
• Life expectancy;15  
• Logged number of conflict-related deaths;16  Logged number of refugees and 
IDPs.17 
This list is not exhaustive. The strategic interests of donors and the humanitarian needs 
of recipients may be characterised by several different factors – too many to model here. 
Narang focused on the most common variables, which are widely used in the majority 
of literature on foreign aid. In doing so, his goal was to extend this literature to the 
allocation of humani- tarian assistance for the first time. 
Research findings for countries in conflict  
For the in-conflict sample, Narang’s statistical analysis provided little support for the 
notion that donors’ strategic interests substantially dictate the allocation of 
humanitarian aid. With few exceptions, humanitarian aid to ongoing civil wars appears 
to be positively associated with rising indicators of humanitarian need. Generally, the 
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analysis showed the disbursement of aid to be unrelated to the strategic interests of the 
largest donors. 
Narang’s analysis also showed that there are generally very few differences between the 
determinants of bilateral aid by DAC donors and multilateral aid by international 
organisations (IOs) and NGOs. Nevertheless, some important dif- ferences emerge.  
Firstly, the number of conflict-related deaths was positively associated with the level of 
humanitarian aid from multilateral donors but not from bilateral donors. This means 
multilateral donors have provided more aid where there were more conflict related 
deaths. It may suggest that multilateral agencies are slightly more ‘humanitarian’ in as 
much as they provide more aid when there are more victims.  
Secondly, multilateral humanitarian aid giving was positively correlated with whether a 
country is a former colony of the P5. In other words, former P5 colonies received more 
multilateral aid. This was not a significant predictor of bilateral aid giving.  
Finally, DAC donors tended to provide more humanitarian aid to formally demo- cratic 
recipients. This variable showed no correlation with multilateral aid provisions.  
But Narang’s results suggest that neither bilateral nor multilateral aid appears to be 
significantly determined by strategic factors. 
Research findings for post-conflict countries 
For post-conflict countries, Narang’s results do provide some support for the claim that 
humanitarian aid provision was strategic in such countries during the Cold War.  
For instance, a country’s status as an oil exporter or democracy was positively correlated 
with the level of aid it received. This means countries that are democratic and/or oil 
exporters received more aid post-conflict. 
Narang’s findings also suggest important differences between bilateral aid from DAC 
donors and multilateral aid from IOs and NGOs. Firstly, multilateral donors and NGOs 
appeared much more responsive to the number of conflict-related deaths than DAC 
donors. Secondly, DAC donors tended to provide humanitarian aid to more democratic 
post-conflict recipients. This factor showed no correlation with multilateral aid.  
Together, these results may suggest that aid from multilateral agencies is slightly more 
humanitarian. An interesting exception is that multilateral humanitarian aid giving 
appears to be more likely if a country is a former colony of the P5. This is not a significant 
predictor of bilateral giving from DAC donors. 
When is humanitarian action more strategic than humanitarian? 
Consistent with humanitarian principles, the statistical analysis found that humanitarian 
aid allocated to ongoing civil wars is substantially more humanitarian than strategic. 
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However, in post-conflict countries, there is some evidence that humanitarian 
assistance is a special case of foreign aid giving. Despite a principled commitment to 
assist people in need equally, strategic, supply-side factors (i.e. political-strategic 
interests) appear to be just as important – and arguably more important – in explaining 
the allocation of humanitarian aid in these countries as demand-side factors measuring 
need in recipients. 
Once civil wars end, high levels of aid appear to go to countries where donors perceive 
important strategic and political interests, even after controlling for the level of need. 
This finding supports the common assumption among aid practitioners that conflict-
affected states tend to be gradually ‘forgotten’ over time, in favour of countries that are 
strategically more-important – despite very high needs in these countries.  
The analysis also found some evidence that determinants of humanitarian aid giving vary 
according to donors. Bilateral aid from DAC donors to post-conflict states appears to be 
more strategic than non-earmarked aid disbursed through IOs and NGOs. 
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3.2. Impartiality and the forgotten crises in Yemen and Myanmar 
Sabrina Khan 
The international humanitarian community is committed to the principles of impartiality, 
neutrality and independence – yet there are many reasons why crises are ‘forgotten’. 
The humanitarian crises in Yemen and in Myanmar, for instance, are among the most 
severe in the world, but people in both countries do not receive nearly enough aid. Islamic 
Relief is active in both Yemen and Myanmar. It assists large numbers of people, but like 
many other NGOs, it faces great challenges in both countries. Forgotten crises must not 
be left to NGOs alone. The entire humanitarian community must raise awareness of such 
crises and improve funding mechanisms. 
The international humanitarian community is committed to adhering to the 
humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. Of these 
principles, impartiality may be the one that most clearly expresses what humani- tarian 
aid is supposed to be: It should be provided on the basis of need, and it should not 
discriminate. This means, people who need help have a fundamental human right to 
receive this help, regardless of their ethnicity or their political, national or religious 
affiliations. There are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ victims in situations of distress and emergency, 
there are only human beings. Impartiality therefore expresses the core value of 
humanity.  
Why are some crises forgotten? 
Why, then, are some crises ‘forgotten’? Why do they receive much less aid than other 
crises? How can the international community ‘forget’ to deliver humanitarian assistance 
to people following natural or man-made disasters? And why is it that poor and 
marginalised groups generally receive the least aid? One explanation is that 
humanitarian crises which attract a great deal of media attention are more likely to 
receive (public and private) funding than more forgotten crises.1 And while some 
disasters dominate the news (the 2004 tsunami in South East Asia or the one in 2011 in 
Japan, for instance), many others receive very little attention (such as the conflict in the 
Central African Republic). It seems that neither public nor private donors seem able to 
avoid what is known in the humanitarian sector as the ‘CNN effect’: When the media 
provides continuous coverage of a natural disaster or conflict, a crisis is put into public 
focus and many people, as well as public donors, are more likely to provide funds. But 
when the media attention shifts to other issues or countries, public interest declines and 
the funding for aid programmes decreases. But humanitar- ian crises have long-term 
effects and the affected populations need support beyond the immediate disaster 
period – for rehabilitation, protection and preparedness for the future. 
It is also often suggested that aid levels are determined less by need than by political 
interest. Neil Narang has researched this perspective (see pages 26-33), and suggests 
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that individual historical, political or economic relations between donor governments 
and receiving countries impact on the level of aid.2 Governments sometimes use 
humanitarian aid when they are unwilling to take political action in specific crises. This 
is one way in which humanitarian aid is instrumentalised. 
It is claimed that private donors are also biased in this way: They may be more willing to 
support disaster victims in neighbouring countries than in those which are further 
away.3 Psychologically, it might be easier to ‘forget’ people who are more remote and 
so ignore the principle of humanity4 in such cases. The recent arrival of large numbers 
of refugees in Europe, for instance, has brought some humanitarian crises much ‘closer 
to home’. As a result, efforts have been taken to fund programmes aimed at keeping 
refugees away or to confine them to transit countries like Turkey, Jordan or Iraq.5 In such 
cases, political interests seem to matter more than people’s needs. 
The lack of humanitarian access6 is another reason why some people who need aid the 
most do not receive it. Access can be restricted by governments, or limited due to high 
insecurity or because of major logistical obstacles. The situation in Myanmar is one 
example of this: Violence broke out in northern Rakhine in August 2017, leading to huge 
numbers of people fleeing into neighbouring Bangladesh. Many humanitarian 
organisations were willing to intervene, but they were not given access. Such restrictions 
on access for aid agencies, the media and independent observers continue to this day 
and they are preventing needs assessments and the delivery of aid.  
The complexity of conflicts can also result in some crises being underfunded, when 
conflict parties are linked to – are assumed to be linked to – terrorists groups. Donors 
are hesitant to provide funds in such cases, fearing misuse: This was observed when The 
German Relief Coalition (ADH) launched appeals for Syria. In 2012 the situation in the 
country was already catastrophic, but the appeal that year secured less than half the 
donations raised by the 2015 Nepal earthquake appeal. The Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) was among the conflict parties at the time and starting to gain power inside 
Syria. Similarly, it was difficult to raise funds when a 50-day war killed around 2,250 
people in Gaza in 2014. The donations at the time barely exceeded 250,000 Euros. 
Hamas was one of the conflict parties in this case.  
Another reason why crises are forgotten crises: natural disasters, conflicts, forced or not 
prioritised is that needs are gen- displacement etc. Raising sufficient funds erally 
increasing and crises are becoming to address all these needs is therefore a more 
complex. Most countries in need huge challenge. of assistance are affected by multiple  
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Recent initiatives to address forgotten crises 
Despite all this, there is generally more awareness of forgotten humanitarian crises 
nowadays. The European Union’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department 
(ECHO) has contributed to this by issuing an annual Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA).7 
This identifies the most neglected crises worldwide. And parts of the annual 
disbursements from the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund8 (CERF) are 
also used to fund humanitarian relief interventions in forgotten crises. 
The initiatives of the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) and of German humanitarian 
NGOs (networked in the Coordination Committee for Humanitar- ian Aid) are also worth 
mentioning. Both have been advocating more attention for forgotten crises for years. In 
2016, GFFO and various German NGOs launched a campaign9 to raise awareness of 
forgotten humanitarian crises. As part of this, they launched the “#nichtvergesser”10 
initiative (loosely translated as: “those who do not forget”) on social media. Such 
initiatives set new standards in putting forgotten crises centre stage. They contribute to 
the overall goal of responding to crises in a more equitable, timely and effective way, 
and so help improve and strengthen the humanitarian aid system. 
Islamic Relief and its work in forgotten or neglected crises  
Adhering to the principle of impartiality, Islamic Relief (IR) seeks to bring forgotten crises 
into focus. The organisation is active in Somalia, Yemen, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, 
South Sudan, Chad and Mali, for instance – all countries where crises receive little overall 
attention even though many have dragged on for years. IR has been active in some of 
these countries for decades. In the following sections, we will provide insights into IR’s 
interventions in Yemen and Myanmar. 
The forgotten crisis in Yemen 
The current crisis in Yemen is one of the worst in the world. Due to conflicts between 
groups in the southern and northern parts of the country, Yemen has suffered from 
years of instability. This has led to poor governance, under-development and 
widespread poverty. The conflict escalated dramatically in March 2015, but even before 
then, almost half of all Yemenis were living below the poverty line, two-thirds of all 
youths were unemployed, and basic services were on the edge of collapse. Almost 15 
million people were in need of some form of humanitarian assistance. 
Since then, the situation has grown increasingly worse: The intervention of Saudi Arabia 
and its coalition has dramatically escalated the armed conflict between various rebel 
groups and the Yemeni armed forces. A chronic water shortage throughout the country 
has had dramatic impact on hygiene and agri- culture. Up until now the conflict has 
claimed 8,75711 lives. More than 50,000 people have been injured, and more than 3 
million have been displaced from their homes. Conflict, displacement, and economic 
decline are pushing basic services to breaking point. As a result, millions of Yemenis are 
 37 
 
dependent on humanitarian assistance for their survival.12 Currently, 22.2 million 
people13 are in need of humanitarian assistance or protection, with 11.3 million in acute 
need. Between June and November 2017 alone, needs have risen by 15 percent. 
Currently, 22.2 million people in Yemen are in need of humanitarian assistance or 
protection. 
Islamic Relief in Yemen: Projects and challenges 
Islamic Relief has been active in Yemen since 1998. Since its inception, the organisation 
has been assisting people in need in the country in three major programmatic areas: 
relief and emergency response, development, and orphan and child welfare. The 
country head office is in the capital Sana’a, and there are eight branch offices in Dhamar, 
Amran, Aden, Taiz, Hodeida, Saada, Maarib and Rymah. IR is responding to disasters and 
emergencies, and linking its activities in this sector to sustainable economic and social 
development programmes. We are mobilizing resources, building partnerships with 
local actors, and developing local capacity to enable communities to mitigate the effect 
of disasters. 
The needs of children, especially internally displaced children, are being addressed 
through the orphans’ sponsorship programme and several other projects. IR is also a key 
player in the nutrition sector in the country, in response to high levels of malnutrition 
across the country. As part of our development programmes, we rehabilitate rural 
roads, build water wells, restore water sources, run agricultural projects, rehabilitate 
health centres, offer psychosocial support for children and adults and provide vocational 
training for young people. 
Because IR was already active in the country, we were able to launch an emergency 
response within 72 hours when the violence flared up in March 2015. To help respond 
to the crisis, Islamic Relief Yemen launched an appeal to institutional donors as well as 
to the Islamic Relief Network across Europe, America, Asia, South Africa and Australia. 
Since then, we have provided emergency lifesaving humanitarian assistance to more 
than 3.2 million people in 15 governorates in the country. These interventions have 
included water supply, sanitation and hygiene, health, nutrition, food security, and 
education. A focus on child protection and gender-based violence was included across 
all sectors.  
Despite successfully implementing these projects, IR is facing important chal- lenges in 
Yemen, and aid for the people there needs to increase significantly. Gaining access to 
different geographical areas is dependent on the permission of the authorities in control 
of those areas. In seeking this permission, IR and other INGOs are confronted with 
authorities trying to influence the delivery of aid, imposing prepared lists of 
beneficiaries, aligning budgets to their priorities or suggesting local partners. Relief 
organisations, among them IR, which resisted these demands, were denied visas to 
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enter the country or permission to travel within it. In extreme cases, operations were 
suspended or closed down. Sometimes offices were closed down temporarily. 
Given such obstacles, it becomes an even bigger challenge to reach the people who need 
assistance the most. Some groups are neglected by aid organisations: These include 
patients suffering from chronic conditions such as diabetes or car- diac disease and 
those in need of regular dialysis. Especially vulnerable groups in remote and inaccessible 
areas, such as pregnant and lactating women, malnourished children, elderly people and 
those with disabilities do not receive enough assistance either. 
The restrictions imposed by the authorities also result in higher costs for the 
implementing organisations. This is because they have to reorganise and adjust their 
strategies and plans to find ways to reach people in urgent need – as set out in the 
humanitarian principles. 
But despite the challenges and difficulties and the very unstable security situation, 
Islamic Relief teams have been assisting vulnerable people in Yemen for 20 years now. 
By maintaining neutrality, impartiality and transparency, IR has the advantage of being 
trusted and accepted by the majority parties. Consequently, we have been able to access 
all communities, including the most vulnerable population groups in the majority of all 
governorates in the country.  
The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar 
The population of Myanmar is ethnically include Bamar/Burmans (60-70%), Shan very 
diverse, with more than 130 recog- (10%), Kayin (7%), Rakhine (4%), Chinese nised ethnic 
groups in the country. These (3%), Mon (2%), Indians (2%) as well as many others 
including Rohingyas, Kachin and Chin. Burmans are concentrated in the lowlands of 
Central Myanmar, while other ethnic groups predominate in the mountainous border 
areas. About 87% of the population are Buddhists, 4-5% are Muslims (Rohingyas), and 
6-7% are Christians. 
The dominance of the largest ethnic group, the Burman or Bamar people, over the 
country’s many minorities has led to long-running political unrest. As a result, the people 
of Myanmar have experienced some of the longest running civil wars in the world. The 
country is also among the poorest and least developed in the world. An estimated 25.6 
percent of the 53.8 million people in the country live below the national poverty line.14 
Decades of insecurity have left some parts of the country severely underdeveloped, with 
entire communities unable to access basic services such as healthcare and education. 
On the United Nations Development Programme’s 2015 Human Development Index, 
Myanmar ranks 148th out of 187 countries.15 The World Health Organization has ranked 
Myanmar’s health system 190 out of 191 in the world.16 
Backed by a wave of international support and widespread optimism, a new government 
took office in Myanmar in March 2016, promising a process of political and economic 
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reforms. At the end of 2016, however, the violence in Northern Rakhine intensified. 
Since then the situation has escalated, with violence flaring up again in August 2017: 
Hundreds of villages have been razed to the ground, most of them inhabited by people 
of the Rohingya minority. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced. 
Since August 2017 alone, 607,000 Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh and nearly one 
million refugees have fled to the border area between Myanmar and Bangladesh. 
The humanitarian crisis has continued into 2018. It is a complex combination of armed 
conflict, inter-communal tensions, displacement, statelessness,17 forced migration, 
vulnerability to natural disasters and food insecurity. An estimated 863,00018 people in 
the country are in need of humanitarian assistance. Among them are 166,000 people 
affected by conflict in Kachin and Shan States. Due to the ongoing violence, the constant 
risk of landmines, and a failure to reach any kind of peace agreement, there has been 
little success in finding long-term solutions for displaced people. 
Those in need of humanitarian aid also include 691,000 people in Rakhine State (most 
of them Muslims) who face inter-communal violence, constraints on freedom of 
movement, denial of official documentation and other restrictive poli- cies and 
practices. Such restrictions limit people’s access to basic services and work in the state, 
leading to high levels of dependency on humanitarian aid. 
Since August 2017 alone, 607,000 Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh and nearly one 
million refugees have fled to the border area between Myanmar and Bangladesh. 
Islamic Relief in Myanmar: Projects and challenges 
Islamic Relief started working in Myanmar in 2008, when we provided relief and 
recovery support following Cyclone Nargis. In 2012, we provided support to 
approximately 100,000 people (both Buddhists and Muslims) in Rakhine State in 
response to inter-communal conflicts – one of the forgotten crises in Myanmar. Since 
2014, IR has resumed operations in Myanmar, supporting at least 18 projects through a 
local partner. Activities included providing emergency relief and recovery in Rakhine, 
Kayin and Ayeyarwady states. A coordination office was opened in Yangon in December 
2015. IR’s strategic focus in the country is on building local capacity. 
The continued access restrictions for humanitarian aid agencies, the media and 
independent observers in Myanmar have prevented needs assessment among the 
conflict-affected communities, especially in Northern Rakhine State (NRS). It is not 
possible for aid agencies to assess the return conditions for displaced people, for 
instance, or the long-term viability of their return. Without knowledge of the true extent 
of the humanitarian crisis in the conflict areas in Rakhine, Kayin, Kachin or Chin, the most 
pressing needs cannot be identified and appropriate responses and long term solutions 
cannot be designed. It is not only access to these areas that is restricted; there is also a 
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shortage of information from baseline surveys and development indexes from 
government agencies. 
However, despite the political circumstances IR has been accepted by local partners, 
communities and government agencies, and we are therefore able to continue with our 
programmes in Rakhine, Kayin and Ayeyarwady states. 
The humanitarian system needs more awareness of forgotten crises and better 
funding mechanisms 
The example of IR’s work in Yemen and Myanmar has highlighted a few of the challenges 
humanitarian NGOs face when working in some of the world’s most severe but 
neglected humanitarian crises. In both countries, humanitarian needs are immense, but 
it is difficult to provide impartial help to adequately address those needs. Islamic Relief 
is running projects that are essential to the survival of large numbers of people in Yemen 
and Myanmar – yet more humanitarian aid is urgently needed in both countries. 
But forgotten crises should not just be left to NGOs. It is the duty and responsibility of 
states and the whole international humanitarian community to give adequate attention 
to these crises. A key aspect of this is raising awareness of these crises. In addition, 
financing mechanisms must become more flexible if humanitarian assistance is to be 
more effective. We must ensure humanitarian organisations can respond to crises at the 
right time, and that funds are distributed equally and according to needs. For this to 
happen, both donors and humanitarian organisations must increase their transparency 
and provide better data. 
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3.3. Casestudy: Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo 
Birgit Lembke and Eva Hinz 
Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe in the DR Congo 
• Active in the country for over 15 years, with a national office in Goma since 2010  
• Relief programmes with local partner organisations, mainly in Kivu and Ituri 
Provinces  
• Relief provision in Kasaï-Central since 2017, with two partners, in the areas of food 
security, relief goods, shelter and housing, and protection 
• 4.5 million internally displaced people in the country: the largest movement of 
people worldwide 
 
In October 2017, the United Nations raised the status of the humanitarian crisis in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to a Level 3 Emergency – as in Syria and Yemen. 
Vast numbers of people are suffering from hunger, displacement and conflict in the 
largest country in Africa, hidden from the eyes of the world. There are 4.5 million 
internally displaced people – more than in any other African country. Yet this crisis has 
effectively been forgotten. 
Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe has been working in partnership with various organisations 
in the region for more than 15 years, primarily in Kivu province in recent years. This 
remote region has suffered almost 20 years of unbroken violent conflict involving 
diverse rebel groups and the national army. In the course of these hostilities, horrific 
attacks have been carried out on civilians by all the conflicting parties. 
Humanitarian assistance in DRC is especially challenging due to the complex struggles 
for power and resources and also the diverse political, ethnic and geo- strategic interests 
on the local, regional and national levels. Conflicts often spill over into neighbouring 
countries and are historically rooted in the colonial period. At the same time, battle lines 
can rapidly shift on the ground. It is a very difficult task to respect the principle of 
impartiality in such a context, to apply conflict sensitivity and to select beneficiaries 
purely on the basis of their humanitarian needs. 
In the case of localised violent conflicts, such as in Kasaï Province, it is almost impossible 
to distinguish between perpetrators and victims. In accordance with the Do No Harm 
approach, we carry out a conflict analysis in such cases and attempt to avoid negative 
repercussions. This involves stating our principles very clearly to the conflicting parties: 
during the initial on-site needs analysis, in preparatory meetings with communities and 
during project activities. We do not take sides and we take action solely based on the 
needs of the people. Our priority is to help the most vulnerable regardless of their 
nationality, ethnic origin, or religion. The Kasaï region was formerly peaceful, but in 
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2016, violent conflict broke out. It rapidly escalated, fuelled by the tense political 
situation in the country, public frustration about the constantly delayed elections, and 
the lack of government recognition for local, traditional power structures. Both the 
government and international actors have had an influence on the humanitarian crisis, 
but there is a lack of political will to effectively tackle the causes.  
More than one million people were displaced in Kasaï during the first six months of 2017. 
The region lies in the country's interior, about 1,500 km from the Diakonie 
Katastrophenhilfe project office in Goma. In spite of the logistical and coordination 
challenges, we were determined to respond to the immense humanitarian needs of the 
people. Beginning in summer 2017, we teamed up with partner organisations from 
North Kivu to provide emergency relief in Kasaï-Central in the form of food security, 
shelter, relief goods and protection measures. Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe was one of 
the first international NGOs in the area, since one of our local partners already had an 
office in the region. But it was not a simple matter of transferring our experience in the 
Kivu provinces to Kasaï. There was a huge geographical distance, as well as linguistic and 
cultural barriers to overcome. There was also a considerable risk of getting caught up 
between the armed factions or causing the conflict to escalate. The situation required 
flexibility, good communication lines and consensus within and among the affected 
communities. Our partner-based approach made things significantly easier: The staff of 
our Congolese partner organisation had established contact with important local actors 
through their office in Kasaï; they could speak the local language, and were able to help 
us gain access to the region and the target group. 
his consisted of two large village communities which had been embroiled in violent 
confrontations. These two communities were both victims and perpetrators at the same 
time. We provided relief to both communities according to the principle of impartiality. 
We made a conscious decision not to refer to victims and perpetrators or to give 
prominence to the conflicting parties as such, but rather to focus on the needs of the 
people. In addition to direct emergency relief in the form of food vouchers and seeds, 
for instance, we introduced conflict prevention as an important element. This is because 
past conflicts do not disappear simply by providing urgently needed relief – even though 
they might die down or become less visible. 
Due to a lack of neutral places to meet, one of our partners came up with the idea of 
establishing “peace huts” in which representatives of the various communities could 
meet and discuss on neutral ground. The idea was to promote dialogue between the 
conflicting parties and to create a space for meeting and debate. Although it is not 
possible to carry out intensive reconciliation work within the context of humanitarian 
relief, we must nonetheless strive to preserve the positive effects of our work 
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4. Does localisation make humanitarian action more impartial?  
4.1. Local humanitarian actors and the principle of impartiality 
Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop 
To provide more effective help, local and international organisations must work together 
to implement the humanitarian principles. The projected funding increases for local 
actors as part of the Grand Bargain might be an opportunity: Those in greatest need may 
finally receive the help they urgently require. But who are ‘local actors’? And do these 
actors face greater challenges than their international counterparts when it comes to 
providing impartial assistance? And if so, what can be done in response? 
Asked if the May 2016 Istanbul World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) has produced any 
tangible outcomes, many in the humanitarian community would refer to the step of 
recognising the indispensable role local actors play in humanitarian response. They 
would point to the target that 25% of global humanitarian funding  
be allocated to local actors by 2020. This target was agreed by a range of UN agencies, 
NGOs and major donors as part of an agreement called the ‘Grand Bargain’. It implies a 
significant growth in financial resources that should reach local humani- tarian actors 
“as directly as possible” in the next few years.1 
Why local actors are becoming more important 
For a range of international NGOs, working through – or with – local organisations has 
been standard practice for many years. Many are church-affiliated NGOs which have 
natural counterparts in local dioce- ses or parishes. Working with and through these 
local structures is the way these organisations operate. NGOs such as Christian Aid or 
Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), the British Caritas affiliate, have 
been among the loudest voices pushing the localisation agenda.  
These organisations advocate for changes in how the international humanitarian system 
operates and have encouraged many organisations to sign the Charter for Change which 
calls for more locally- driven humanitarianism.2 The International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement is, of course, another major stakeholder in the localisation debate, 
as their network of national societies helps them combine global and local action. 
One reason for the increased importance of local actors is found in the changes in the 
humanitarian landscape. Either because of assertive host governments, or due to high 
levels of insecurity, or both, international organisations find it increasingly difficult to 
enter crisis-affected areas, now often labelled as ‘hard to reach’ or ‘high-risk 
environments’. Rather than being an exception, remotely managed operations have 
become the standard for many organisations. In these instances, local organisations and 
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individuals have been contracted to deliver much-needed assistance, including in cross-
border operations.  
Another reason why there is more attention on local humanitarian actors is because 
several have become more organised and are more vocal on a global level. The Network 
for Empowered Aid Response (NEAR), for example, brings together a range of NGOs 
from the developing world and its creation coincided with the WHS. 
Remotely managed operations have become the standard for many organisations. 
As welcome as it may be, public recognition of the indispensable role of local actors in 
humanitarian response has led to several debates. This essay sets out to discuss two 
questions involved in these debates: 
• What is a local humanitarian actor? 
• And do local humanitarian actors have more challenges than their international 
colleagues in applying humanitarian principles, in particular the principle of 
impartiality? 
• Who should be defined as a ‘local actor’? 
Who should be defined as a ‘local actor’? 
The likely increase in financial resources at the disposal of local humanitarian actors as 
part of the Grand Bargain leads us to ask who would qualify for the money. ‘Local actors’ 
is a broad term. Some, like the NEAR network, have equated the term ‘local actors’ with 
local NGOs. These are only one sub-set of local actors. While other formal documents in 
the sector refer to ‘local capacities’, the Grand Bargain refers to ‘local responders’.3 This 
term could comprise a wide range of very different institutions and individuals, groups 
and communities, from government authorities at various levels to private businesses, 
and national NGOs to community-based networks.  
In an effort to provide clarity, a working group that is part of the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee, the main international body for humanitarian coordination among 
operational organisations, has been working on a so-called localisation marker. This 
working group has come up with a number of categories, including:  
• National NGOs/civil society organisations (CSOs)  
• Local NGOs/CSOs  
• Red Cross/Red Crescent National Societies 
• National governments  
• Local governments  
• Local and national private sector entities 
These broad categories create a conve- nient space for a large variety of stakeholders to 
interpret the commitment to localise humanitarian aid according to their own interests 
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and agendas. All of this is to say that the global debate on defining who is local and who 
is not has arrived at a dead-end. It would be much more relevant to define locally (for 
example, at a national level) which local actors deserve further financial support. 
A debate has emerged at the international level since the Grand Bargain agreement, 
focusing on identifying what characterises actors as local or international. Only those 
which fall within the definition of local actors would be eligible to receive a share of the 
committed increase in financial resources.  
What looks international from the outside may be very localised in reality, with the 
reverse also being true. The Haitian branch of CARE, for example, has been in the 
country for more than five decades and is registered as a local NGO. In Iraq during recent 
research, UN and international NGOs referred this author to two organisations that they 
described as ‘local’, which were actually either run by expatriates or by people (born 
and/or) raised in Western Europe. At the same time, an Islamic NGO registered in the 
UK, and therefore referred to as an international NGO, was run entirely by Iraqis and has 
been in the country since 1991.4  
Debate, therefore, should focus much more on the reality on the ground. At the 
moment, it is largely conceptual in nature and is producing unproductive northsouth 
tensions. The 25% target set by the Grand Bargain may do more harm than good. 
Focusing on who is humanitarian 
Further debate could be “Who is humanitarian and who is not?”. The defining 
characteristics are found in the four core principles of humanitarian action. Without 
considering these principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, it 
would be difficult to understand how certain activities could be qualified as 
humanitarian.  
Humanity and impartiality in particular are principles that give humanitarian assistance 
meaning and purpose. Neutrality and independence are derived principles, instrumental 
in realising the first two. These latter two principles should therefore perhaps be seen 
in a different light for local actors compared to their international colleagues. Most local 
actors are active in other social areas as well as humanitarian aid. Inherently, neutrality, 
in terms of not engaging with root causes of a conflict, looks unnatural for them. 
Likewise, their independence has to be understood in the context of the space their 
respective states allow for civil society to operate in. In a growing number of countries, 
this space is under significant pressure.5 
Within the humanitarian community, it is not common practice to point to NGOs and 
other humanitarian organisations when they do not follow the principles. If 
humanitarian identity is to be strengthened, more dialogue, scrutiny and reporting is 
needed, both among humanitarian agencies and within them. Much has been published 
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on the humanitarian principles, but it is only in the last few years that the body of 
research on their practical application has increased. 
There is a stark difference between calling for principled humanitarian action and 
implementing it. An MSF report on localisation notes that scepticism in the humanitarian 
community about the application of the principles does not only concern local actors.6 
Other recent reports point to a number of issues when it comes to delivering principled 
humanitarian action.7 They paint a rather bleak picture of the application of the 
principles. Several challenges in applying the principles are obstacles such as the non-
observance of the rules of war by parties to the conflict or the conditions by donor 
governments that stipulate with whom humanitarian organisations can interact on the 
ground. Other problems appear to be more of an internal nature, for which the 
organisations themselves are responsible. They include, for example, a lack of attention 
to the principles in decision-making, or unfamiliarity with the principles among 
operational staff.8 
Impartiality is key in defining who is humanitarian 
The obvious question for local humanitarian actors in relation to humanitarian principles 
is whether or not they are expected to apply the same principles as their international 
colleagues. And if so, do they face similar challenges in applying these principles?  
For all humanitarians, the principle of impartiality could be seen as the piv-otal criterion. 
Together with the principle of humanity, it sets out the goal of humanitarian action, i.e. 
the preservation of every human life.9 The principle of humanity is beyond question, 
and, as stated above, neutrality and independence are derived principles. They are 
instrumental in realising humanity and impartiality. The principle of impartiality can 
guide us when prioritising humanitarian action in extreme situations.10 While the 
principles are not irrelevant in natural disas- humanitarian aid is commonly maniputer 
contexts, their relevance is obvious lated and instrumentalised for political in situations 
of armed conflict where purposes. 
The global debate on defining who is local and who is not has arrived at a dead-end. 
What impartiality looks like on the ground 
Considering the definition of impartiality,11 there are two interrelated components: Aid 
must be allocated in proportion to need and without discrimination.12 To start with the 
latter, a recent study on the principles in Iraq found that many staff of humanitarian 
organisations spontaneously noted the obligation not to make any distinction between 
beneficiaries on the grounds of ethnic or sectarian origins.13 In Iraq, like other wartorn 
countries, this is no small thing as sectarian divisions among Kurds, Shi’ites and Sunnis 
have been among the causes of war. Many international NGOs have expressed concerns 
that they could not take their Kurdish staff to Sunni-dominated areas in Iraq. If this is a 
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challenge for international NGOs, it is likely to be an even bigger issue for local 
organisations.  
As a recent study describes, “local organisations are rooted in their historical, cultural, 
and religious constituencies and they have to report back to them in formal or informal 
ways”.14 Put differently, family members, relatives, friends, and others from the same 
area or district, will have expectations in terms of who should receive assistance and 
who should not. This is a particular challenge in armed conflict situations, where ethnic 
or religious divisions are prevalent. Local groups may be in a better position to enter 
areas that are off limits to international staff and organisations because of their local 
knowledge and networks. But this comparative advantage may be offset by their 
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or intimidation.15  
Applying the other component of the principle of impartiality, in proportion to need, is 
equally if not more challenging. It is a misunderstanding that a humanitar- ian 
organisation needs to deliver services on all sides of a conflict. The determining aspect 
of this idea of impartiality is ‘most in need’. The term can imply a single presence in an 
area controlled by one of the parties involved in a conflict. But in such instances other 
parties are likely to challenge an organisation’s neutrality. The organisation’s staff must 
then use their negotiation skills to illustrate how they are adhering to the principle of 
impartiality.  
In Iraq, as in some other countries, a number of areas have been labelled as ‘hard to 
reach.’ This is a disturbing trend as it is precisely in these areas where humani- tarian 
capacity should be prioritised. The needs of people are likely to be the highest and most 
urgent in such areas with high levels of violence and insecurity. By its design, 
humanitarian action is expected to be undertaken in such circumstances, not as act of 
bravery or heroism, but as the outcome of negotiations with the warring parties. The 
‘hard to reach’ label has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Many humanitarian 
organisations find it too risky to visit these areas to deliver assistance, and have instead 
prioritised other less volatile areas for which funding is also relatively easy to obtain. As 
a result, ‘most in need’ is one aspect of impartiality that has been neglected.  
Much has been published on the humanitarian principles, but it is only in the last few 
years that the body of research on their practical application has increased.  
Prioritising those most in need 
This view is one that resonates with research on international humanitarian standards 
frameworks, in particular the 2014 Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS). The research 
found that while the humanitarian system supports inquiry into non-discrimination, 
there are gaps in the CHS in terms of verifying whether organisations target those most 
in need.16 
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‘Most in need’ also came up in a peer review initiative of the Steering Committee for 
Humanitarian Response (SCHR) in 2013. In Colombia, this international NGO network 
examined the application of the principle of impartiality by its members. It found that 
members applied the principle of impartiality to different degrees. Some had applied it 
at a national level, but most had applied it at a departmental or district level.17 In other 
words, for some organisations, ‘most in need’ is the prime motivation in defining priority 
interventions and areas in a country. But most other organisations do this after they 
have identified the area where they should be active.  
The earlier decision to identify a certain area may be done on other grounds. For 
example, the presence of local organisations, previous experience in the country, or 
good relations with the authorities. Ironically, if an international organisation has chosen 
an area because of the presence of a local partner, but where needs are not the most 
urgent, localisation could be seen to contradict the principle of impartiality. 
These findings point to the issues of scale and level. It seems appropriate to urge 
international organisations to use a global18 and a national level to define ‘most in 
need’. The ‘global level’ in relation to which countries they should work in and the 
‘national level’ to determine which areas should be prioritised. For local organisations, 
it would seem a logical consequence to define ‘most in need’ in the region where they 
are based. Because of their local knowledge and links, working in another district or 
province may be comparable to an international NGO entering a new country. 
Impartiality in partnerships 
If abiding by impartiality is at least equally challenging for local organisations as for their 
international colleagues, another question is whether and how their joint partnerships 
address this challenge. A recurring issue in the context of local humanitarian actors is 
the strengthening of capacities. Debate usually centres on covering institutional costs as 
local actors often become de facto sub-contractors for an international organisation.  
New investment in local capacity- strengthening should not only focus on reinforcing 
operational capacity, for example through technical skills training – they should also 
focus on the institutional capacity of local actors, including their understanding of 
humanitarian principles and standards. For international organisations which have 
pursued partnership approaches as their standard way of operating, such as the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, this is not a novelty. For many 
others, it may be. If the long-term vision for local partners is to become stronger and 
more competent humanitarian actors, training and mutual learning initiatives on 
humanitarian principles are not an option, but a necessity. 
Conditions for establishing partnerships 
It is particularly relevant that training on humanitarian principles forms an integral part 
of capacity-strengthening efforts when organisations work in armed conflict areas. A 
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recent report on localisation says that “certain international actors work with local 
actors who, taken individually, are not neutral or impartial”.19 For the international 
actor that recruits such local groups, it is best to recruit as many as possible on different 
sides of the conflict in order for humanitarian aid to be, and to appear to be, impartial 
and neutral.  
It could be argued that two conditions should be taken into consideration by an 
international organisation when they work with a local actor to pass the test of 
‘principledness’. The international organisation should:  
• be transparent about their approach and explain why it recruited a local actor. 
For example, did it have no choice but to work with this organisation?  
• discuss humanitarian principles with local partners and offer training on the 
principles, to support them in becoming more credible humanitarian actors in 
the long-term. 
Mutual learning is the way forward 
Challenges of applying the principle of impartiality are seen for both local and 
international organisations. It is time to move beyond this distinction to think in terms 
of the complementarity of humani- tarian actors based on their comparative 
advantages. They should share their experiences and lessons in conforming to and 
working with all the humanitarian principles. There is room for improvement in the 
context of partnerships and capacity-strengthening. Mutual learning, especially at a field 
level, is the way forward. 
There is work to be done on a conceptual level too. The most authoritative source on 
humanitarian principles for NGOs, the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations in Disaster 
Relief, is written entirely from an international perspective. Indeed, it was an 
international NGO network, the SCHR, which led its drafting.  
The international language of the code is reflected in principles two and four. Principle 
two, which covers impartiality, says that “wherever possible, we will base the provision 
of relief aid upon a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the 
local capacities already in place to meet those needs”. For local actors, this would imply 
a self-assessment.  
It is a misunderstanding that a humanitarian organisation needs to deliver services on 
all sides of a conflict.  
Principle four, covering independence, notes that the signatories “shall endeavour not 
to act as instruments of government foreign policy”. This refers to accepting donor funds 
in which NGOs could become part of the political objectives of the donor government. 
Now that some donors might be able to provide direct funding to local NGOs, this could 
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become a reality. For a national NGO, however, it might be more relevant to make sure 
that it maintains autonomy towards national authorities. If local humanitarian NGOs are 
expected to subscribe to the 1994 code, its language needs to be updated. The current 
text is not suitable for them. 
All actors need to engage with the humanitarian principles 
Finally, humanitarian principles, especially impartiality, are relevant in addressing 
difficult operational questions collectively. These questions are rarely unique to a single 
organisation. In fact, very often they are common challenges. This is why the principles 
should also drive the work of the humanitarian clusters and other coordination 
mechanisms. With the future increase in financial resources for local actors, it is likely 
that a number of donor governments will use country-specific pooled funds (which local 
NGOs can access directly – the so-called country-based pooled funds) to realise this 
commitment.  
Therefore, these funding mechanisms have a particular responsibility when it comes to 
promoting humanitarian principles. One prerequisite is to build connections with local 
actors, especially NGOs. Efforts should be made to introduce local actors to the 
international humanitarian system. The quality and effectiveness of humanitarian action 
will only improve if all humanitarian actors consistently engage with the four core 
principles. 
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4.2. On the importance of community engagement for principled 
humanitarian action 
Inez Kipfer-Didavi, with contributions from Liliane Bitong 
“You think you are the solution, but the solution comes from the community”1 
Local actors can implement the humanitarian principles, but in certain contexts this 
poses challenges for them. In order to meet these challenges, local actors need greater 
institutional and financial power. This should be based on a broad localisation approach 
that actively involves and strengthens people affected by crises and their informal 
networks and official institutions, and also strengthens their ability to apply the 
humanitarian principles. 
The humanitarian principles – international norms with local roots 
In 1991, the UN General Assembly defined the “humanitarian principles” as humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality.2 This was expanded to include the principle of independence 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its 1994 Code of Conduct.3 It 
is interesting to note that the Red Cross had already formulated additional principles 
back then, among them respect for the local culture, the use of local capacities, 
participation, accountability towards donors and affected people, and also respecting 
human dignity in humanitarian communications. These additional principles, which will 
also be addressed here, have gained far less international acceptance and therefore had 
to be reinforced by new initiatives – for example by means of the SPHERE Standards, the 
Core Humanitarian Standard and the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS). 
Humanity, which is defined in the humani- tarian principles is also a central pillar of the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as is human dignity. Moreover, humanity 
and human dignity were central ideas in the freedom, liberalisation and democratisation 
movements of western Enlightenment. The notion of humanitarianism can also be 
found in all world religions, from Christianity and Islam to Hinduism, Confucianism and 
Judaism.4 It is reflected in many philosophical world views5 and in numerous local 
cultural concepts and forms of expression.6 
“Help me during the floods, I will help you during the drought”:7 Who are ‘local 
humanitarian actors’? 
There is no standard definition for ‘local humanitarian actors’, a fact which makes 
analysis and discussion more complicated. Relatives, neighbours, friends, local networks 
and relief organisations, local religious or political institutions and local government 
agencies are usually the first to provide assistance in the event of a humanitarian crisis 
– long before international organisations (NGOs or the UN) arrive on the scene and 
before donors release the necessary funds. This has been demonstrated after natural 
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disasters such as the earthquake in Nepal in 2015, or Typhoon Haiyan, which struck the 
Philippines in 2013, and after violent conflicts such as the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. 
In many crises it is local actors who take in the largest number of internally displaced 
people (and to some extent refugees as well8) and provide them with emergency care, 
be it in Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan,9 Iraq,10 Sudan11 or in the DR Congo and Uganda.12 
There are frequently delays before foreign relief organisations arrive on the ground, and 
they often only remain in an area temporarily – for as long as their funding allows and 
they can ensure the safety of their staff. Local actors, however, do not leave the area 
where they are giving help, except if they are forced to flee themselves. They are the 
ones who have to deal with the long-term consequences of a crisis, whether they want 
to or not. Furthermore, they are often the only protagonists in a conflict region with 
access to the affected people - and thus the only ones who can meet the humanitarian 
imperative at all (principle of humanity).13 We can currently see this in Yemen, parts of 
Somalia, Darfur, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, northern Nigeria, Syria, 
Myanmar, Ukraine and increasingly in Pakistan and Nepal. For this reason, international 
organisations are increasingly cooperating with local actors, especially with local NGOs 
and above all in such dangerous contexts. 
Is it harder for local actors to uphold the humanitarian principles than for international 
actors? 
Most people affected by crises are neither aware of international humanitarian law nor 
of the humanitarian principles as such. For many people around the world it is normal 
that the initial relief efforts benefit ‘their people’, such as neighbours, and only benefit 
‘the others’, or their adversaries, to a limited extent. Often, the issues of impartiality and 
neutrality first become contentious when substantial relief resources – in terms of value 
or duration – are at stake in larger-scale conflicts and those providing assistance have to 
select which beneficiaries to help. This applies equally to local actors and international 
relief organisations. 
Local organisations generally have a much better understanding of local conflicts and 
the relevant local actors than outsiders.14 This means that they are better able to judge 
what impartial and neutral help means in concrete terms. In addition, local actors usually 
strive to avoid getting caught ‘between the fronts’ and to remain non-political and 
neutral in their actions (principle of neutrality). However, being a service provider of 
basic provisions in a conflict region is one way of gaining public legitimacy. For this 
reason, conflicting parties often view such services as a threat to their power, and thus 
obstruct them (sometimes violently) – or, conversely, they support them and exploit 
them to consolidate their own power.15 This explains how humanitarian relief can 
rapidly become polarised in a conflict. 
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There are situations, such as in Myanmar or northern Nigeria at present, in which the 
affected society is so deeply divided that the conflicting parties cannot tolerate local 
organisations assisting people on both sides of the conflict. Local relief workers who find 
themselves on the ‘wrong side’ risk their lives in such cases. External organisations such 
as the ICRC are then required to provide neutral assistance and to avoid exacerbating 
the conflict. As Schenkenberg has noted, impartiality may be achieved in such a tense 
situation – at least on a higher level – when external organisations work together with 
non-impartial actors on both (or various) sides to ensure that those in need are given 
help. This may in any case be necessary for security reasons at certain times.16 
Schenkenberg is therefore correct in his assertion that local NGOs are, per se, no better 
at upholding the humanitarian principles than international NGOs. However, the reverse 
is also true. 
International relief organisations can only gain acceptance among all conflicting parties 
and the local population if they are able to credibly demonstrate that their help is 
neutral and impartial. Parties to the conflict watch closely to see whether relief is neutral 
or if it is caught up along ethnic, religious or political conflict lines; whether it is needs-
based or provided according to social categories (such as ethnicity, age, gender, social 
class, religion etc.); whether individuals are discriminated against and whether their 
human dignity is respected in the process of providing and receiving assistance.17 For 
example, it has been reported from northern Nigeria18 that an international NGO 
specialising in healthcare has been criticised by the local population for showing bias 
and lacking neutrality, as it mainly treats people associated with Boko Haram – 
presumably because they are not given treatment by any other service provider. Local 
people similarly have little understanding for re-integration programmes for ex-
combatants, since these are perceived as a kind of ‘reward for the murderers’. Although 
such programmes are not strictly part of ‘humani- tarian relief’, this makes no difference 
to the local population. 
These examples show that while factual impartiality is important, how it is perceived 
also plays a role. This is why it is so important to explain the humanitarian principles to 
affected people, conflict parties and other local actors and, crucially, to discuss with 
them how these principles can be implemented. 
The call for humanitarian principles within the international political discourse 
concerning compliance with international law has considerable significance and 
urgency. Unfortunately, up to now many international NGOs have merely proclaimed 
their adherence to the humani- tarian principles to public and private donors – yet they 
have failed to train their national and international staff in the implementation of the 
principles as an important orientation tool in daily humanitarian work. At the same time, 
they rarely allow themselves to be drawn into difficult discussions about local dilemmas 
with the affected people in order to find collaborative solutions. 
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The localisation debate at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbu 
The starting point for the WHS was the declaration that the current humanitarian 
system and its limited financial resources, which are heavily bound up with the United 
Nations and with international NGOs, can no longer meet the constantly growing 
global need for humanitarian relief. Therefore, in Istanbul there were calls from many 
sides to strengthen the role of governments as well as local and national civil society 
organisations as first responders in crises and conflicts. These protagonists need to be 
empowered to take effective preventive action against conflicts and natural disasters 
in their own countries; to deal with humanitarian crises without outside help, and to 
rebuild social and economic infrastructure quickly in order to maintain long-term social 
stability and encourage development. 
This was accompanied by the appeal to shift the focus of humanitarian relief and crisis 
prevention to the affected people themselves and to recognise their right to a life of 
dignity, security and self determination. Numerous consultations with affected people 
prior to the actual summit led to the conclusion that – from their perspective – relief 
has so far often failed to address their actual needs, and that international relief 
organisations have generally not involved them in assessing requirements and 
planning the relief programmes. Moreover, affected people felt that external relief 
workers often did not understand their local capacities and structures. As a 
consequence of this, they felt ignored or even that their structures were weakened by 
the aimless zeal of external protagonists. This lack of local affiliation and local control 
was also said to facilitate the misuse of relief funds and to increase the risk of making 
the affected people dependent on international relief.19 
Consequently, people affected by crises made vehement demands at the WHS for 
greater inclusion by relief organisations, both in terms of planning their operations and 
in decision-making. Furthermore, they demanded that all relief efforts be linked with 
local strategies and cap- acities and support rather than weaken them. 
Civil society conferences, the regional WHS steering committees20 and the 2015 WHS 
Global Consultation21 have given their full support to these demands, and the UN 
General Secretary incorporated them in his report on the WHS, including the Agenda for 
Humanity.22 
Localisation in the Grand Bargain 
The above considerations pertaining to the localisation of humanitarian relief have also 
been incorporated in the Grand Bargain23 – an agreement drawn up between several 
governments and UN organisations at the WHS. It contains diverse workstreams which 
were agreed upon, some of which should be mentioned here:  Funding should go as 
directly as possible to institutional local and national actors and should be increased, as 
Ed Schenkenberg stated. At the same time, the global humanitarian cash flow from the 
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original donors to local actors should be measured and made transparent (Grand 
Bargain Transparency Workstream). 
  Assistance in the form of relief goods should be reduced in favour of cash transfers, 
and local markets should be increasingly used – in those places where the situation and 
the markets allow it. This should give affected people more choice and freedom to 
decide and thus help preserve their sense of dignity (Grand Bargain Cash Workstream).24  
 People and communities affected by, or at risk of, crises should be informed25 and 
actively included in humanitarian decision-making processes26– and this applies to local 
relief actors as well. This is to be tantamount to a ‘participation revolution’ and should 
be realised by means of collective standards for reporting and continual dialogue. Of 
prime importance is that the most vulnerable people have a voice in how humanitarian 
services should be implemented and evaluated. This dialogue should also be 
accompanied with funding modes that help local actors to work participatively and to 
respond flexibly to the views, needs and priorities of affected people (Grand Bargain 
Participation Workstream).27  
 Relief funds should be less determined by regions and sectors, and country based 
pooled funds should be increased. Such funds should facilitate decisions concerning the 
inclusion of local actors on governallocation to people and regions in mental and non-
governmental levels greatest need according to coordi- (Grand Bargain Less Earmarking 
Worknated assessments – with greater stream). 
Not everything that is labelled ‘local’ is actually local 
Localisation in the sense of political and economic empowerment for people affected by 
crises, their self-help groups, and local aid organisations is an important step towards 
achieving greater human dignity and adherence to the humanitarian principles. This 
should not be considered equivalent to a localisation that solely aims to support the 
NGOs registered in the respective country without checking whether they are rooted in 
the local society, work along lines of participation, and are able to take decisions 
independently (without state intervention). 
As Ed Schenkenberg also writes, not everything that is labelled ‘local’ is actually local. 
Local NGOs that function like consultancy firms but are not actually rooted in the local 
society might well be accomplished and well-versed in the repertoire of the 
international humanitarian system. But they may ultimately only differ from 
international NGOs due to their greater local knowledge and lower travel costs. Indeed 
such NGOs run the same risk of planning relief operations without involving the affected 
people or considering their needs. In such cases, they would equally fail to respect the 
dignity of vulnerable people and thus violate the principle of humanity. And they might 
equally fail to clearly communicate their neutrality and impartiality to the affected 
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people, as described above, and to live out those principles in ways that are acceptable 
to them. 
It is a welcome development that there are already a few pioneering, well-positioned 
locally-registered NGOs that act as professional role models. Such NGOs are to be found 
among those involved in the newly-founded NEAR network28 and also among the long-
term partners of faith based international NGOs, many of which have signed up to the 
commitments in the Charter4 Change.29 
However, it should again be emphasised that we are not only concerned with locally 
registered NGOs. Rather, the often less organised and less vocal informal structures and 
institutions that act as first responders should be supported. The task ahead requires us 
to strengthen these groups in accordance with their own priorities, to link them up with 
national and international actors, and to enable them to provide larger-scale 
humanitarian relief as described further below. The relief they provide has to be guided 
by the humanitarian principles and they should be capable of conveying these principles 
to conflicting parties and affected people in a credible way. It is ultimately these informal 
structures and institutions that can and must implement the link between humanitarian 
relief, development, and peace-building that is currently being discussed (the so-called 
humanitar- ian-development-peace-nexus). 
Since the 2016 WHS, the civil society debate about localisation has been restricted to 
the demand for an increase in direct funding for ‘local’ NGOs while questioning who 
exactly qualifies as ‘local’. This limited discourse is on the one hand attributable to the 
general increase in competition among international NGOs for funds which, though 
higher than before, are still insufficient. Some of these NGOs have so far provided a 
portion of their relief themselves, using many of their own (international and local) staff 
– in other words, largely without local partners. These organisations now fear the 
potential loss of their existing or future ‘market share’ to local NGOs. Others see it as an 
opportunity to expand their own operations (e.g. the NEAR Network30) or those of their 
local partners (the Charter4Change31 signatories). 
On the other hand, the demand that funding is directed straight to registered local NGOs 
reflects the determination of many international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs) and some donor countries (e.g. the German government) to put into action the 
commitments made during the WHS concerning an adjustment of funding mechanisms. 
For some donors, at least, this form of localisation probably seems more feasible and 
easier to control than strengthening the informal community levels. 
How can local first responders be given concrete support? 
As we have seen, it is crucial to support local first and last responders and to facilitate 
their capacity to act. This applies regardless of whether they are institutional, registered 
NGOs that are recognised by their own government, or structured along less formal 
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social relationships – including for example relatives, neighbours, community groups, 
youth clubs, grass roots organisations, self-help groups for people with disabilities etc. 
With respect to the informal level, this kind of empowerment needs to begin with a 
participative dialogue between relief organisations and representatives of the various 
social groups in an affected community.32 This would give affected people an 
opportunity to express their concerns and needs, while offering their views on the 
causes of these problems. They can list the steps they have already taken themselves 
and, where applicable, identify capacities and competences that might require external 
support.  
Experiences with this sort of community engagement have shown that affected people 
often ask for advocacy training which will help them to better understand and claim 
their rights – in accordance with both national laws and inter- national humanitarian 
law. The latter also implies engagement with the humanitarian principles. Moreover, 
affected people want to be informed in a transparent way about the access routes to 
state/nonstate and international relief funds and financing mechanisms. It is important 
for them to understand how money is used by relief organisations and how, at least in 
rough terms, the accounting has to be carried out. This allows them to exert a certain 
degree of control over relief organisations (or their staff) and thus minimise the risk that 
money is misappropriated or misused for political purposes. In addition, affected people 
would often like access to small loans or professional training. Stronger financial 
independence also gives communities a degree of protection against government 
exploitation or manipulation.33 
In other words, capacities are not strengthened by abstract donor plans and principles, 
but rather by approaches that accommodate the cultural circumstances, consider local 
actors and their values as resources, and include affected people in the dialogue. 
In the case of institutionalised local NGOs, financial support should also be accompanied 
by institutional capacity building. This could, for example, take the form of increasing 
legal knowledge (see above) as well as skills in fundraising and in conflict analysis and 
resolution. In conflict contexts, international partners have so far paid too little attention 
to training local NGOs in security management in particular. They have also ignored the 
fact that this involves specific costs. This has led to prohibitive risks for local NGOs.34 In 
addition, trainings in community engagement competences are important to put local 
NGOs in a position where they can conduct a participative dialogue with affected people 
in their own society and include them in an empowering way. 
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The localisation debate in Germany 
In 2014, during the lead-up to the World Humanitarian Summit, German humanitarian actors 
compiled a series of recommendations for strengthening local NGOs. The recommendations were 
based on the evaluation of 22 reports from German NGOs and the findings were incorporated into 
the summit process.35 The driving force behind this undertaking were VENRO member 
organisations, many of which have already been implementing their humanitarian relief projects 
partly or exclusively with local partner organisations for many years. Consequently, they consider 
respect for and knowledge of the humanitarian principles by local actors an essential prerequisite 
for the successful expansion of the latter’s role in the humanitarian system. 
Since the WHS in 2016, German NGOs have been working intensively on this issue in collaboration 
with the German Federal Foreign Office. In January 2018 they compiled a joint paper36 to provide 
orientation for German humanitarian actors when operationalising the localisation agenda. In it, 
they adhere to the definition set down in the Inter Agency Standing Committee’s humanitarian 
financing task team, according to which national and local NGOs and civil society organisations – 
as well as the Red Cross/Red Crescent societies and national government offices – are to be 
considered ‘local actors’. The less organised, lower levels are also mentioned: 
“On its own, humanitarian relief cannot promote the creation of independent civil society, though 
it can, preventively in the medium term, strengthen the organisational structures and humanitar- 
ian capacities of local actors from the national level to affected populations on a community level 
in humanitarian crisis situations. By this means it can contribute to the resilience and local co- 
determination of affected people.” 
The paper demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of localisation: It defines as core 
elements a broad range of capacity building measures and improved access to funding for local 
actors, and also the reassignment of coordination responsibilities – moving away from 
international actors to more involvement of local actors. The latter has already been successfully 
put into practice in a number of crisis-hit countries (Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia etc.). 
The paper describes to what extent the various existing partnership and cooperation models 
between international and local NGOs in different humanitarian contexts serve the 
implementation of the humanitarian principles – and where this poses specific challenges, 
especially in complex crises and violent conflicts, where potential partnerships and cooperation 
with local NGOs have to be carefully weighed up. In sudden on-set disasters there needs to be 
early investment in long-term partnerships combined with adequate capacity development. 
Concrete action plans and proposals as well as good-practice examples complete these analyses. 
However, what is so far lacking in the German debate are precise ideas about how to achieve 
partici- pation and co-determination for the affected population. For this, it would be advisable to 
evaluate the previous international debates.37 The “new understanding of the role of INGOs (...), 
e.g. as cap- acity developers, moderators/advisors for local actors”, developed in the benchmark 
paper, should be concretised. The experiences of VENRO member NGOs with the People First 
Impact Method (P-FIM) as well as the ideas of the ReflACTION think tank can contribute to this 
process 
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Here too, the requirements and priorities for training need to be defined by the local 
NGOs themselves. The localisation debate should not repeat the past mistake in which 
‘we’ discuss whether ‘they’ will be supported – or whether ‘they’ are the first 
responders, and what ‘they’ need to learn in ‘our’ opinion. Instead, ‘we’ should start to 
listen and engage in a dialogue on equal terms. 
In conclusion: The reform of the humanitarian sector must combine localisation and 
empowerment 
In view of the crises and conflicts around the world, a radical reform of the humani- 
tarian sector is unavoidable. This reform must work towards the political and economic 
empowerment of local actors. This does not only include providing them with 
comprehensive, direct financial and institutional support. Rather, local and international 
NGOs (and also local gov- ernments) must promote the participation of people affected 
by crises on an informal, local level. 
This approach requires that international and local actors strengthen their community 
engagement competences. Moreover, the INGOs must change their perception of their 
role – indeed such changes must go beyond Schenkenberg’s demand for an updated 
language in the ICRC Code of Conduct. There will be fewer cases in which INGOs 
implement projects themselves, be it alone or in a subsidiary or complementary role to 
local NGOs. Instead, they will in future have a greater role in supporting local (formal 
and informal) actors in their own processes and considerations. This can contribute to a 
situation whereby in the medium term, local and international NGOs work together in 
partnerships on a truly equal basis which could also include the affected people. In this 
way, all parties can learn from each other and provide mutual support. 
A broad localisation approach such as this can strengthen the independence and 
impartiality of local NGOs. It can also lead to more respect for human dignity. This is 
absolutely essential, especially for the principle of humanity. 
Translated from German by   
Alexander Zuckrow 
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26 The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS) is pioneering 
here. Potential tools for its application include the Ground Truth’s Constituent Voice 
method (Nik Rilkoff for Save the Children, Danish Church Aid and Ground Truth 
Solutions 2016, online at www.danchurchaid.org/about-us/quality-assurance/the-
listen-learn-act-project [06.03.2018]) and the People First Impact Method by Gerry 
McCarthy and Paul O’Hagan (cf. Inez Kipfer-Didavi for Johanniter 2017, online at: 
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/people-first-impact-method- p-fim-community-
engagement-tool-enhance-relevance [06.03.2018]).  
27 Cf. Recommendations that promote effective participation of people affected by 
crisis in  humanitarian decisions and incentivise participation as a way of working for 
GB signatories,  Grand Bargain workstream 2, July 2017, pp. 1-4. 
28 http://near.ngo/our-reach [06.03.2018]. 
29 https://charter4change.org/signatories [06.03.2018]. 
30 Founded in 2016, the NEAR Network is a network of local and national NGOs from 
the global south. Its common goal is to “transform the humanitarian and 
development policy system from its topdown approach to a locally planned and 
managed system with equitable, dignified and  accountable partnerships”. See 
www.near.ngo [06.03.2018]. 
31 In the Charter4Change – Localisation of Humanitarian Aid, 29 INGOs (among them 
four from Germany) made a commitment following the 2016 World Humanitarian 
Summit to pass on 20 percent of their humanitarian funds to local NGOs by May 
2018. They aim to account for this share in a transparent way, and clarify the role of 
the local actors in their communication. 150 local and national NGOs have endorsed 
the charter in writing. Online at: https://charter4change.org [06.03.2018]. 
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32 Examples of such participatory and empowering approaches on the community level 
ares the People First Impact Method by McCarthy and O’Hagen (http://www.p-
fim.org [06.03.2018]), and the Resiliency Framework developed by CORDAID. 
33 McCarthy and Kipfer-Didavi. (2016). Ic., p. 7. 
34 Stephen, Monica, lc., pp. 10-11. 
35 Contribution to the World Humanitarian Summit by the German Coordination 
Committee for  Humanitarian Assistance, 2014, (inc. appendix by Inez Kipfer-Didavi). 
Online at:  https://ngovoice.org/search?q=whs+german [06.03.2018]. 
36 „So lokal wie möglich, so international wie nötig“ – die Lokalisierung des 
humanitären Systems, Eckpunkte zur Umsetzung durch deutsche humanitäre 
Akteure, draft (as of November 2017). 
37 Particularly those of the Grand Bargain Workstreams on “participation revolution” 
sketched out above, the IASC Task Teams on Accountability to Affected People and 
the broad ranging  experiences within the CHS Alliance and the CDAC network. 
38 The original version of this article is published in the German edition of this volume: 
Quack,  Martin (ed.). (2018). Allein nach dem Maß der Not? Unparteilichkeit in der 
Humanitären Hilfe. 
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4.3. Casestudy: Caritas in Ukraine 
Andrij Waskowycz and Gernot Ritthaler 
Caritas Ukraine  
• In the country since 1994 
• Key focus areas: Health, family, prevention of human trafficking, emergency relief in 
crises  
• Humanitarian relief on a large scale since the start of mass movements of people 
resulting from the conflict in eastern Ukraine  
• Measures to secure people’s basic needs and livelihoods, medical care, rehabilitation 
and integration of internally displaced people 
Until winter 2013/14, the principle of impartiality was barely considered in the work of 
Caritas Ukraine, because the social conflicts in the country had no effect on Caritas' 
traditional line of work, e.g. in home medical care and mobile youth work. This all 
changed after the so-called “Revolution of Dignity” on Maidan Square in Kiev, the 
subsequent annexation of the Crimea, and the conflict in the east of the country. Caritas 
began providing support to many internally displaced people and affected local 
populations and thus quickly became one of the largest humani- tarian actors in the 
region. Consequently, the organisation had to consciously focus on the humanitarian 
principles. 
Parallel to the various phases of the conflict, Caritas Ukraine went through a learning 
process. This was to raise awareness of the humanitarian principles among the staff and 
ensure the realisation and practical implementation of the principles. The process 
involved three phases:  
• Internal learning and mainstreaming;  
• Adapting procedures and documents;  
• Practical implementation. 
In April 2014, shortly after the annexation of the Crimea and after the first wave of 
internal refugees had fled the peninsula, Caritas Europa organised the first seminar on 
the SPHERE standards in humani- tarian response. The resulting conclusions and 
methods were subsequently applied when Caritas Ukraine accompanied and supported 
large groups of Muslim Crimean Tatars after their escape to western regions of the 
Ukraine.  
When fighting began in the east of the country, the issue of neutrality in humanitarian 
assistance gained special significance. In the affected areas, Caritas Ukraine was faced 
with two problems: On the one hand, it was necessary that the staff should not provide 
one-sided relief, irrespective of their own political views. On the other hand, some 
segments of the population in the war zone considered Caritas – as well as other 
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humanitarian organisations that were providing relief– "pro-western" and biased. As the 
number of civilian and military victims rose, accusations of political bias became more 
hostile. Moreover, there was a general polarisation of views in the population of the 
country. 
This situation prompted Caritas Ukraine to draw up a clearer notion of humanitarian 
neutrality. This formed the basis of large-scale needs-oriented relief. Caritas Ukraine's 
own experience in other fields came into play in this process, for instance its experience 
in AIDS relief or in combating human trafficking, because Caritas staff had to learn to 
support people without prejudice and to challenge stigmatisation in these projects. In-
depth knowledge exchanges with international partners were also beneficial – including 
with Caritas Germany, Caritas Austria, Caritas Europa or Catholic Relief Services (CRS) on 
issues such as the changing notion of their role, necessary institutional change, and the 
practical implementation of neutrality and impartiality. Moreover, practice-oriented 
training courses for national project managers and local decision-makers from eastern 
Ukraine on SPHERE and the Core Humanitarian Standards made important 
contributions.  
The SPHERE training sessions in particular were an important catalyst: They led to Caritas 
Ukraine examining its previous approaches and its own notions of neutrality and 
impartiality, while assessing and adapting its local practices under international 
guidance. This process is now being continued by local trainers. 
Examples:  
• Staff of different nationalities and ethnicities, with diverse religious beliefs and 
political views, work together in the Caritas humanitarian relief teams. 
• In order to prevent discrimination when providing assistance, a complex system of 
complaint mechanisms including local "complaint boxes", hotline numbers on food 
packages, and web-based feedback forms was introduced. This has been 
supplemented by targeted surveys.  
• The main language used at Caritas Ukraine is Ukrainian, but in humanitarian 
assistance we are now producing documents in Russian too. This had not previously 
been standard practice, and it is challenging to some of the staff in terms of their 
identity and allegiances. It is important to ensure that the political views held by aid 
workers do not influence the selection of beneficiaries. The selection process must 
therefore be transparent and constant monitoring and supervision is required. 
Caritas Ukraine has introduced an evaluation system based on collective decision 
making to establish the level of need. 
Despite these efforts, the risk of being manipulated for political purposes or becoming 
the target of deliberate misinformation campaigns remains present. The principle of 
impartiality requires constant vigilance, especially in the context of a "hybrid" war in 
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which disinformation and propaganda are used as instruments of war. Impartiality in 
Ukraine is therefore being implemented in a context of competing humanitarian, 
political and personal interests. Within this context, and in dialogue with its partners, 
Caritas Ukraine continues to strive towards an ideal whilst trying to ensure its best 
possible implementation. 
Translated from German by Alexander Zuckrow 
 
5. Conclusion 
5.1. Humanitarian action and impartiality:  Where do we go from 
here? 
By Martin Quack, with Nina Zimmer 
The authors in this collection of essays all affirm that the principle of impartiality lies at 
the heart of humanitarian action. They examine some of the most important challenges 
in implementing this principle and describe some of the current trends and approaches 
to tackling these challenges. But above all, the essays underline how humanitarian 
assistance and protection are often precarious and inadequate – with grave 
consequences for affected people in crisis zones. They also raise several important 
questions, some of which I would like to sketch out below 
How can we encourage an open debate on the problems of implementing the 
principles? 
The realisation of the humanitarian principles is often difficult, and in many situations 
they cannot be fully implemented. For this reason, Steets and Haver feel it is problematic 
to view them as commandments that may never be broken. They suggest instead that 
humanitarian workers should openly admit that they sometimes have to accept 
compromises. When the principles are held to be in- violable, it is difficult to discuss 
such un- avoidable compromises openly. Kipfer- Didavi points out that relief actors 
should be more transparent about the extent to which they are able to provide impartial 
assistance. She and Schenkenberg call for a more intensive dialogue about the specific 
implementation of the principles – both within and among international, national, and 
local humanitarian organisations, as well as with the affected populations. 
But what steps need to be taken for humanitarian actors to carry out such a dialogue 
about the humanitarian principles in a more open way? Which freedoms are required 
for a critical discussion among humanitarian organisations, and with donors and the 
public?  
I believe the following are some of the questions which need to be discussed more 
openly in Germany: How exactly does the ‘war on terror’ influence humani- tarian 
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action, including relief from Germany? In what contexts is it concei- vable to make 
compromises in implementing the humanitarian principles – and when not? And how 
can humanitarian actors ensure that the sense and purpose of the principles remains a 
decisive factor when striving to implement them in the right way? 
Do the humanitarian principles have the same meaning for both international and 
local actors? 
According to Schenkenberg and Kipfer- Didavi, the humanitarian principles of neutrality 
and independence should be viewed differently when considering local and national 
actors compared to their international peers. These principles do not hold the same 
ethical status as humanity and impartiality, but instead serve to put into effect the latter 
fundamental prin- ciples – mostly in order to gain access to people in need. But local and 
national actors often have better access to affected people and are therefore less 
dependent on neutrality and independence.1 And since many local organisations do not 
primarily or exclusively provide humanitarian relief, it could make little sense, or 
perhaps even be problematic, for them to act with complete ‘neutrality’. More- over, 
humanitarian actors from an affected country, particularly local actors, usually 
understand the context and needs better than foreign actors.  
Does this imply that it would be better if local actors themselves decided what 
humanitarian action means in specific contexts, and what forms it should take? This is 
what international relief organisations have always done. Are the humanitarian 
principles more like guiding ideas that have to be implemented differently according to 
context, rather than fixed operational schemes? To what extent are they dependent on 
the position of the respective actors? Yet leaving space for interpretation does not call 
into question the notion that the humanitarian principles are the essential 
characteristics of effective humanitarian action – and thus not arbitrary. It remains very 
important to emphasise the neutrality and indepen- dence of humanitarian action, 
specifically towards governments, in order to ensure that it is not exploited for other 
purposes.  
Does competition between relief organisations make humanitarian action less 
efficient? 
Several articles in this collection mention the competition between humanitarian 
organisations. Kipfer-Didavi, for instance, addresses the fierce competition for funding 
and the fear international NGOs have of losing their market share to national and local 
actors in the course of the so-called ‘localisation’ of humanitarian action (p. 78). Narang 
thinks the independence of humanitarian relief is at risk (see the article by Martin 
Quack), because state donors can select those organisations that give them more 
control over the allocation of funding. Steets and Haver assert that German NGOs, for 
example, could provide more effective help by supporting actors that are already 
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present in the most difficult and dangerous regions instead of operating there 
themselves. To achieve this, however, they would need to “leave behind competitive 
institutional instincts “ (p. 21).  
Competition can promote creativity and inspire action. But when it asserts too much 
influence on the work of organisations in the aid industry – when the main 
considerations are funding amounts and market shares – it could become impossible to 
realise the humanitarian principles. Are independence and impartiality, as Narang 
claims, really something that only few organisations can afford in the increasingly 
competitive humanitarian sector? Or are humanitar- ian organisations able to limit the 
effects of competitive thinking and promote their collective goals more vigorously, 
despite growing competition? 
How will humanitarian action be financed in future? 
The funding of humanitarian action has a direct and significant effect on its impartiality. 
Governments and NGOs have different responsibilities in this respect. Looking at so-
called ‘forgotten crises’, it is patently clear that state funding is sometimes allocated and 
dispensed on the basis of strategic interests and not only according to humanitarian 
need. Donini predicts, moreover, a decrease in funding by Western donors primarily as 
a consequence of the USA’s decreasing involvement. The authors also suggest other 
reasons for potential funding problems: Khan claims that restrictions imposed by 
governments in the context of the ‘war on terror’ may lead to difficulties and increased 
costs in providing relief. And Donini states that funds for humanitarian action are being 
used to care for refugees within domestic borders in more and more countries.  
Thus, although the demand for humanitarian action and therefore the costs have 
increased in recent years, it is possible that there will be less funding available in future. 
The considerable increase in funding provided by the German government in the last 
few years is an exception. 
So will other crises become ‘forgotten’ too? What consequences will this have for 
humanitarian organisations and donors such as the German government in terms of 
their future strategies? And what role should humanitarian action play in crises that 
persist despite decades of relief work – such as in the case of Palestine refugees and 
UNRWA? In Germany too, the question has been raised as to which criteria dictate the 
use of humanitarian action funds.  
Reform or Decolonisation? 
Both Donini and Kipfer-Didavi emphasise the need for reform in the humanitarian 
system. The stronger role assumed by local actors shows how such a reform could 
manifest. This is partly a consequence of the disengagement of western actors – or, put 
differently, of the ‘decolonisation’ of humanitarianism (p. 12). This decolonisation 
should include all the different levels and actors of the humanitarian system, including 
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the 1994 Code of Conduct (see Schenkenberg, p. 69). The role of international 
humanitarian organisations will also probably change due to the more prominent role 
taken on by national and local actors.2 But was the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit a 
serious enough attempt at reform? Are inter- national organisations taking concrete 
steps to hand over power? Will only a few particularly prominent actors from the global 
south benefit? The recent sexual abuse scandals by foreign ‘aid workers’ in crisis zones 
are further evidence of a massive imbalance of power. Don’t they also show that the 
road to reform and decolonisation is going to be far longer than we might have 
thought?3 And how can humanitarian actors prevent governments from misusing this 
important reform process to harm NGOs that they consider ‘disagreeable’? 
What steps need to be taken for humanitarian actors to carry out a dialogue about the 
humanitarian principles in a more open way? 
Are the perspectives really so bleak? 
Governments sometimes use humanitarian relief as a stopgap measure to cover up their 
political inaction – including when they cannot or will not prevent or end violent 
conflicts, as Donini asserts. Schenkenberg points out that more and more regions are 
dangerous for humanitarian workers, above all war zones. And Khan mentions the 
problem that donors often suspect links between certain conflicting parties and terrorist 
groups. For fear of allowing relief funds to benefit the ‘wrong’ actors in some way, they 
hold back funds or tie them to conditions that prevent impartial assistance. Steets and 
Haver, and also Khan, mention the political pressure – which also exists in the EU and 
Germany – to use humanitarian relief to ‘combat the causes of migration and flight’ 
rather than basing it on need. Relief funds for the Sahel or Afghanistan, for example, are 
granted on the condition that these countries control migration and push back refugees, 
as Donini argues. Such developments give political interests priority over the needs of 
people who are fleeing war, injustice and hardship. In this way, they undermine the 
humanitarian imperative.  
Can this behaviour of many governments be explained by their lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the ethical basis and necessity of the principle of impartiality? Might 
a more profound social understanding, a ‘humanitarian consciousness’,4 so to speak, 
help create the necessary political pressure to enable a humanitarian action that is loyal 
to these principles? The rather pessimistic interpretation of the current political climate 
as described in this collection of essays is, in my view, accurate. However, it would be 
highly problematic to simply project this onto the future. Humanitarian organisations 
in particular should have a positive vision of a future in which violence, natural disasters 
and refugee numbers do not automatically increase. What specific role could 
humanitarian organisations play in, for example, the UN’s 2030 Agenda? This is, after 
all, a political commitment made by all countries  
 73 
 
We need connections between theory and practice 
Impartiality lies at the heart of humanitarian action, but it also confronts it with major 
challenges. The specific questions and difficulties that arise in its realisation obviously 
go far beyond the principle of impartiality – they pertain to the other humanitarian 
principles, the humanitarian system as a whole, and its political context.  
Real problems require pragmatic solutions. These can include well-considered and 
carefully evaluated compromises. But the sector’s weaknesses should not be ignored. 
These include the ideology of western humanitarianism and its ties to colonialism.5  
Above all, however, impartiality is obviously an ideal that is often far from being realised 
in practice. One could say that the principle serves to defend the humanitarian ideal 
from real political interests, even though humanitarian practice remains part of politics 
itself. This applies not only to humanitarian action but also to human rights policy – from 
which humanitarian action often disassociates itself – and to international law as a 
whole. The humanitarian system is part of a political system that has so far been 
dominated by the west, and in which economic and military interests play a significant 
role. When humanitarian relief is reduced to finding pragmatic solutions to practical 
problems, it runs the risk of only alleviating the worst consequences of decisions made 
by politicians who abuse relief work for their own interests.6 
If we assert that relief should be pro- vided solely on the basis of need, it also implies 
that there are no ‘good’ or bad’ recipients. In phases of political polarisation, the idea of 
humanitarian action can be hard to endure for actors with a black and white mindset. 
Who are the victims, who are the perpetrators? And who, then, needs humanitarian 
protection from whom? The work of Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, for example, shows that there are not always easy answers to 
such ethical questions (see pp. 56-59). Such contexts require an ethical perspective to 
realise the humanitarian principles, for example when humanitarian organisations have 
to carefully weigh up different options before agreeing to necessary compromises.  
Is it possible that an over-simplified perception of humanitarian relief (“simply doing 
good”) hinders the necessary ethical discussions? Among these ethical problems is the 
fact that humanitarian protection still plays a subordinate role to humanitarian 
assistance in many organisations, even though this very lack of protection is often the 
main reason for a humanitarian crisis. In English, at least on a linguistic level, 
humanitarian aid/assistance has now been supplemented with the term ‘humanitarian 
action’ to denote the aspect of protection. In German however, the term “Humanitäre 
Aktion” has not yet gained acceptance. We urgently need to engage in a more in-depth 
discussion about how humanitarian workers can provide the best possible assistance 
and protection. The current debate concerning sexual abuse in humanitarian assistance 
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raises a number of ethical questions and provides an opportunity to talk more honestly 
about some of the ethical challenges involved.7 
In Germany, humanitarian organisations and other actors are already debating many of 
the questions raised here. This collection of essays aims to inspire critical inquiry on 
humanitarian action and in this way contribute to deepening the discussion in Germany. 
To achieve this, we need closer ties between theory and practice, and between 
international and German debates. Impartiality and the other humanitarian principles 
will remain the guiding ideas for such debates in the foreseeable future – not as an 
ideology, but because they can offer a concrete set of tools for providing effective 
humanitarian relief to people in need. 
Translated from German by Alexander Zuckrow 
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